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FBIS-EEU-94-185 *23 September 1994*

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NOTICE TO READERS: Effective 1 October, the processing indicators appearing in brackets at the start of each item in this publication will be changed. All new indicators will begin with "FBIS" to make the material more easily identifiable in databases. Some will also indicate whether the item has been translated from the vernacular or transcribed from English.

All material in this volume previously disseminated in electronic form.

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Deputies Discuss No-Confidence Motion on Meksi

AU2209210294 Tirana TVSH Television Network in Albanian 1800 GMT 22 Sep 94

[Report by Armir Shkurti]

[Text] At this morning's session, the People's Assembly discussed a no-confidence motion on Prime Minister Aleksander Meksi. In this motion, the Socialist Party [PS] parliamentary group blamed the government for the incidents that occurred during the May elections in Libofshe. PS deputies blamed the government for the illicit implementation of privatization in Albania.

Today, PS Deputy Chairman Servet Pellumbi again read out his arguments on the motion.

Mr. Servet, the motion has been presented to the assembly in June, discussed in July, and is being voted on today. Why do you insist so fervently on this motion?

[Begin Pellumbi recording] Events in Libofshe served to instigate the no-confidence motion we presented here. However, I believe that this was not the cause, but the consequence.

We demand the no-confidence motion first, because with their way of governing, Prime Minister Meksi and the cabinet he leads cannot ensure free elections in Albania.

Second, with his way of governing, Meksi has transformed the government into an instrument of political violence in Albania.

Third, Albanians are paying heavily for the reform course that Meksi has chosen, which in our opinion has failed.

Lastly, I would say that this is not only a demand of our parliamentary group, but it is already the demand of the entire Albanian electorate. [end recording]

Here is how Democratic Party Chairman Eduard Selami assessed the no-confidence motion:

[Begin Selami recording] We believe that this motion is the continuation of a fractious policy and failure to recognize the achievements of democracy, which has been the case for almost two years now. I would particularly stress that the loss in Libofshe was truly a major one, that in fact this fractious policy, the policy of defending corruption and the policy of isolation that has become their system, failed to win in Libofshe. I think that the actual motive is the fact that they were not able to devise even one argument and that we won in Libofshe precisely because of our realism and constructiveness. However, to go back to the beginning, this is precisely related to the fact that they have never reconciled themselves to the outcome of the 22 March elections. They have a wistful idea about returning to the source. [end recording]

The deputies discussed the no-confidence motion for five hours.

Mr. Prime Minister, how do you feel about a segment of the parliament not trusting you?

[Begin Meksi recording] Of course, I would have felt better if the whole parliament trusted me. However, I do not think there is anywhere in the world where the entire parliament can trust a government, and particularly in Albania, where we are used to making all kinds of accusations and remarks with the greatest of ease. When a no-confidence vote or anything else is put forward, it always goes back to 22 March, and the government is blamed for everything.

I think that democratic practices allow the opposition to keep notes on every mistake we make, present alternatives, verify and make remarks, and wait for free elections. It is not at all in conformity with the rules of democracy to call for early elections and ask the government to resign the first day it assumes power.

I affirm that this government will do everything in its power to implement the program for which it received the deputies' confidence and for which it will be held responsible. Of course, we would like to have things the way all Albanians would like them to be and I, as a citizen, would like this. However, we are all aware that after 50 years of the complete ruin of Albania and the Albanians, everything cannot be accomplished in one day, one year, or during a meeting. [end recording]

Berisha Expresses Full Support for Meksi, Cabinet

AU2209210494 Tirana TVSH Television Network in Albanian 1800 GMT 22 Sep 94

[Text] The president's spokesman reports that Albanian President Sali Berisha declared today that Prime Minister Meksi and his cabinet enjoy his complete confidence and that of all the Albanians who have supported and will continue to support reform and realistically assess its great achievements in Albania.

Cameria Condemns 'Irresponsible' Arbnori Statement

AU2209082494 Tirana E DJATHTA in Albanian 16 Sep 94 p 4

[Statement issued by the Presidency of the "Cameria" Political and Patriotic Association; place and date not given]

[Text] The "Cameria" Political and Patriotic Association, as the sole political organization in the Republic of Albania directly representing the aspirations of the Cam population, raises its voice in protest against the irresponsible declaration made by Mr. Pjeter Arbnori [People's Assembly Presidency chairman]. Let him, in his high position, meet anybody he wants and whenever he pleases, but by virtue of this very high post bestowed on

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him by parliament in the name of the people, he should be wary of making irresponsible pronouncements. To say that "It is beyond the timeframe of the Helsinki Charter and as unreasonable to speak of Vorio Epirus as it would be for Albania to speak of Thesprotia," means at best knowing nothing about the history of your own people, and at worst is tantamount to betraying the national interests. Thesprotia, or Cameria, Mr. Pjeter, or Southern Epirus, is as much Albanian as Northern Epirus. This is quite well known not only by every Albanian (except you), but also by every Greek. It was the London Conference in 1913 that arbitrarily detached Thesprotia (Cameria) from Albania and annexed it to Greece. It was Greek chauvinism that in 1944-1945 ejected the Albanians of Muslim faith from Cameria by horrific massacres. This is history, and the attitude of the Albanian State in abiding by one of the requirements of the Helsinki Charter, according to which frontiers cannot be changed by force, is another and undoubtedly positive thing. The "Cameria" Association also complies with this requirement, but this in no way prevents it from democratically demanding the Cams' return to their lands in Cameria (Thesprotia) and the restitution of property to its legitimate owners. Expressing once again its determination to carry on the struggle to resolve the Cam question to the end, the "Cameria" Political and Patriotic Association calls on the Albanian parliament to distance itself from this statement by Mr. Arbnori and condemn it as irresponsible. It would also behoove Mr. Arbnori to publicly retract his declaration.

[Signed] Presidency of the "Cameria" Political and Patriotic Association.

Introduction of Taxes Causes Problems for Farmers

AU2309080194 Tirana ALEANCA in Albanian 10 Sep 94 p 4

[Article by Tomorr Bahja: "Taxes—A Despairing Reality in the Countryside"]

[Text] On the basis of Law No. 7,805 of 16 March 1994, the Albanian peasant today faces the challenge of taxes. The state today is indirectly harvesting a host of taxes from the high fees charged for plowing, harrowing, harvesting, sowing, and fieldwork, and from the high prices of fuel, chemical fertilizers, herbicides, etc. However, the main factor is the failure to reclassify agricultural land. Relying on the old classification of the former agricultural cooperatives of the communist regime will mean a heavy burden for the peasantry, if we bear in mind the shocking reality of the "transformation" (not to say the extent of devastation) and the incapacity of the irrigation network. According to this logic, entire villages in communes in the Dumre region will be taxed under the existing classification, i.e. as irrigated land, when the irrigation network either has virtually been destroyed or is largely out of action. The specialists of the zoning department replied to our legitimate concern by saying that "We give accurate and full data on the fertility of the land; it is the government that is in charge of its classification or reclassification. It is not something that depends on us." Nevertheless, the tax law hangs over the peasants' task to reach the most appropriate solutions as soon as possible, putting aside claptrap, and outlining a realistic fiscal policy. In this context, we think that the government must draw up accurate and scientific criteria for the classification of agricultural land, taking into consideration the conditions created by the destruction of the irrigation network. Another worry is the lack of legal verification of title deeds before taxes are collected. One naturally asks why a peasant should pay tax before his legal title is verified, when it is known that there are many discrepancies between what title deeds state and the reality. This is not only because of conflicts between old owners and new owners and the seizure of land by force, but also because of some cases of the inadequate work of land commissions. It is said that the difference between the land value declared on the title deed and the amount of land legally verified will be returned to the peasant in the next tax year. This, to my mind, cannot be taken seriously, and in the context of fiscal policy is a half-baked solution to the problem.

There is an article in Law No. 7,805 of 16 March 1994 that states, "Agricultural land that is not used as such is taxed tenfold." This will give rise to acute social problems. [Words indistinct] people who have no possibility of using their land, either because of the lack of financial resources or the lack of labor? Kadri Luta from the village of Thane in Gjergjan Commune explains, "I have nine children and there are 11 of us at home. I have received land according to the law, but I have nothing to work it with or to sow or to hoe, because neither my wife nor I are on any payroll. There is nobody to work it. So what about my case?" says Kadri, sending out a despairing SOS. After Kadri is taxed tenfold, a sum that he cannot pay, will his land be confiscated?

This is another legal contradiction that the tax law does not solve. The law does not lay down what will happen to people in such cases. Will their land be taken away? This would be the quickest but of course not the fairest solution.

Rugova Cited on International Commitment to Kosovo

AU2109170694 Tirana RILINDJA in Albanian 13 Sep 94 p 4

[Report by "D." on interview with Dr. Ibrahim Rugova, president of the republic of Kosova; place and date not given: "The Peoples of the Balkans Must Be Sovereign in Their Own Countries"]

[Text] "I do not think that the issue of Kosova has been marginalized. The question of Kosova must be viewed in the context of all the problems of the former Yugoslavia. From the minute the international community became involved in the crisis in the former Yugoslavia the

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priority has been to stop the war. Therefore, the idea has been to localize the military conflicts and then to find political solutions for all the problems. In this sense, Kosova is on the political and diplomatic agenda, and is discussed at all important diplomatic meetings. Let us not forget that since the London Conference in 1992, Kosova has been included as an issue without which there can be no overall settlement to the problems in the former Yugoslavia. Moreover, as is well known, a working group on Kosova has also been formed within the framework of the Geneva Conference. I think that efforts will continue to find solutions to all the problematic issues of the former Yugoslavia, and I support the idea of extending these efforts throughout the Balkans." These were the words of Dr. Ibrahim Rugova, president of the Republic of Kosova, in an interview for the magazine ZERI, in which he spoke about the current international position of Kosova and other issues. We carry this interview almost in full.

The Will of the People of Kosova Is Respected

Asked about the possibility of beginning an Albanian-Serbian dialogue on Kosova and initiatives to start these talks, President Rugova replied:

"Several European countries are interested in starting a more serious dialogue, but a way must be found. We have taken the stand that there can be no successful dialogue without the presence of a third party, which must be a party that guarantees mediation of the agreements. I can say that there have been initiatives to start talks from other states besides Russia and Switzerland, and all these have expressed the desire to mediate, which is something positive as far as the Kosova issue is concerned."

Talking about Kosova's international position and the initiatives to solve this question, the president emphasized:

"In general, the international community has not defined what status Kosova will have. I can say that there is respect for the position Kosova had in the former Yugoslav federation; there is respect for the referendum of the citizens of Kosova; and, the current political reality is taken into consideration. The proposals from various positions and different analysts must not be taken as definitive."

Asked about the different initiatives for the Balkans, relations between Albania and Greece, the danger of creating a "vertical Orthodox axis," and "the fear that the West does not know what to do with the Balkans," President Rugova said:

Balkans Undergoing Redefinition Process

"At present, the former Yugoslavia is the main Balkan problem, but it is clear that the Balkans have embarked on a process of redefinition. Our position in this matter is that every people must be sovereign on their own territory; that the Balkan peoples should cooperate, etc.

"There has been talk of a 'vertical Orthodox axis' and a redivision of spheres of interest in the Balkans. This is an old theory from the 19th century, from which Serbia and Greece have both greatly profited. These two are trying to persuade the West that the southern Balkans protect Europe.

"It was once thought that there should exist a powerful state to dominate the Balkans. This was attempted with Greece, and subsequently with the first Yugoslavia, and then with the second. All these attempts failed. I think that this theory is now obsolete and that one can now only talk of a Balkans of equal peoples from which politics and religious extremes will be excluded.

"All the Balkans peoples are small: there is no dominant people. A balance must therefore be found among them. This balance can be a guarantee of peace and stability in the Balkans and Europe," President Rugova said.

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Nuclear Power Agreements With Russia Initialed

AU2209165794 Sofia Khorizont Radio Network in Bulgarian 1500 GMT 22 Sep 94

[Text] On 22 September the Bulgarian Government delegation, which took part in the second session of the Bulgarian-Russian Intergovernmental Commission on Economic and Scientific Technical Cooperation, returned from Moscow.

The issue of mutual payments—the basic issue on which an agreement was expected—was dealt with by adopting the general framework of a package of measures and instruments regarding the mutual financial claims.

Three agreements in the sphere of power generation were initialed: On establishing a Bulgarian-Russian gas company; on cooperation in the sphere of nuclear power generation; and on cooperation in the sphere of the conventional power generation.

Khristo Totev, outgoing minister of construction, said that Russia, Bulgaria, and Russia demonstrated the political will to build an oil pipeline from Novorosiysk through Burgas to Alexandroupolis. The construction will be financed by private investors, if a convincing technical-economic argument is prepared by the end of the year.

Party Deputy Views Conflict With SDS

AU2209072394 Sofia 24 CHASA in Bulgarian 13 Sep 94 p 12

[Interview with Aleksandur Pramatarski, "deputy from Stefan Savov's Democratic Party," by Kameliya Stancheva; place and date not given: "Policy of Splitting Is Fatal for Filip Dimitrov"]

[Excerpt] [Stancheva] Mr. Pramatarski, could we regard the establishment of the Democratic Party-1896 as a split of the Democratic Party?

[Pramatarski] No. These are people who were expelled or left the Democratic Party on their own, thus one cannot talk of a split at all. This is a new organization, created according to the dictate of the National Coordinating Council. One could clearly see among its members the initiators who are part of the National Coordinating Council apparatus. I view all this as a National Coordinating Council attempt to replace a serious and large organization, such as the Democratic Party, with a ridiculous double.

[Stancheva] Was that not the National Coordinating Council's style at previous elections?

[Pramatarski] Yes, and it is a lethal style. The present leadership of the National Coordinating Council was motivated by its dissatisfaction with the fact that the Democratic Party leadership did not sign the political agreement with the Union of Democratic Forces [SDS]. However, I would like to remind you that even before the political agreement was mentioned a group of people in the apparatus, who I would say have no place in politics, already established an initiative committee on forming a new Democratic Party.

[Stancheva] In other words, you agree with Mr. Savov's claim that Filip Dimitrov is trying to split your party?

[Pramatarski] Certainly. Filip Dimitrov and the people around him are trying to split the Democratic Party. This is the only way I could explain what is happening. If he was sincere, really wanted to preserve the unity of the SDS, and aspires to victory in the upcoming parliamentary elections, he would not have made the desperate move of suspending the Democratic Party's membership in the SDS. This fact demonstrates that Filip Dimitrov does not want the SDS to be a strong and united entity. I think that this is a deliberate attempt to destroy the SDS.

[Stancheva] Is there a possibilty of creating a new SDS?

[Pramatarski] I do not think that SDS-2 could be established. The National Coordinating Council does not personify the SDS at present. The National Coordinating Council comprises representatives of parties and organizations that did not exist at all in the previous elections. They were created artificially in order to have more votes in the National Coordinating Council. [passage omitted]

[Stancheva] How will the Democratic Party act under the new conditions?

[Pramatarski] We will convene the Supreme Party Council. I think that it will confirm the central leadership's decision not to sign the political agreement under the existing conditions and blackmail of Filip Dimitrov.

[Stancheva] And this will reaffirm your nonparticipation in the SDS.

[Pramatarski] Perhaps.

[Stancheva] And then....

[Pramatarski] Then the Democratic Party will have to search for partners in Bulgaria's political arena.

[Stancheva] Do you already have somebody in mind?

[Pramatarski] Perhaps. [passage omitted]

[Stancheva] What do you think about establishing a new SDS parliamentary faction?

[Pramatarski] The National Coordinating Council conducts a consistent policy against the parliamentary faction. Naturally, there are people who agree with this situation. I mean deputies who have been promised various things. Thus I do not exclude the possibility of another SDS parliamentary faction emerging. [passage omitted]

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RDP's Yordanov Advocates Anticommunist Council

AU2109164394 Sofia KONTINENT in Bulgarian 19 Sep 94 p 2

[Report by Galina Koleva]

[Text] Aleksandur Yordanov, chairman of the National Assembly and leader of the RDP [Radical Democratic Party], advocates setting up a national anticommunist council to unite all the democratic forces in the country. He hopes that all those who do not want the BSP [Bulgarian Socialist Party] to win the forthcoming elections will rally under the slogan "Everyone With Us." The leader of the parliament plans to put his idea to the SDS [Union of Democratic Forces], which should initiate the formation of the new association.

At a meeting of the RDP National Council during the weekend of 17 and 18 September, the Radical Democrats approved by a majority vote their chairman's signing of the political agreement at SDS headquarters in Rakovski Street. "We do not think we, as founders of the SDS, can be outside the coalition," Professor Elka Konstantinova told journalists. She believes that the RDP members should discuss whether they should not suggest to the SDS National Coordinating Council that two factions should be formed in the SDS coalition: One rallying around Filip Dimitrov, and the other around Stefan Savov and Aleksandur Yordanov. Prof. Konstantinova thinks that the SDS can contest the elections that way and win the votes of most of its supporters. She declared that the RDP is extremely worried about the situation surrounding the Democratic Party, adding that the formation of Stoyan Raychevski's party and the haste with which that party is trying to become a member of the SDS contravene the SDS statute.

Mikhail Nedelchev proposed convening an extraordinary RDP congress in October to discuss the party's election campaign strategy. Some of the delegates at the weekend meeting opposed such an idea because it would only imply that tension existed within the party. In their view, the move to hold an extraordinary congress was prompted only because certain persons will not be selected as candidates in the SDS election lists.

The Executive Committee of the SDP [Social Democratic Party] also met to discuss the criteria for selecting SDS parliamentary candidates. Ivan Kurtev's Social Democrats welcomed his decision to leave the SDS parliamentary group and approved his signing of the SDS political agreement.

The Christian Democratic Union also declared its loyalty to the SDS National Coordinating Council. The union's leader, Yuliy Pavlov, submitted his resignation, on the grounds that he intended to leave political life and did not want to serve as a National Assembly deputy any longer. It is almost certain that he will be replaced as leader by Asen Agov, but Agov will have to wait until 8 October to be elected by the union's general assembly.

The Conservative Ecological Party also approved its leader Khristo Biserov's decision to sign the SDS political agreement.

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Havel, Klaus Affirm Agreement on Action in Haiti

LD2209184594 Prague Radiozurnal Radio Network in Czech 1600 GMT 22 Sep 94

[Interview with President Vaclav Havel and Prime Minister Vaclav Klaus by correspondent Eva Hulkova at the appointment ceremony of Defense Minister Vilem Holan at Prague Castle; date not given—live or recorded]

[Excerpt] [Hulkova] May I use the opportunity of your joint presence, Mr. President and Mr. Prime Minister, to ask your opinion on having been criticized lately for your unwillingness to coordinate beforehand certain of your steps related to statements on some important, mainly foreign, political events—for example, on Haiti.

[Havel] I received a letter from President Clinton in the summer. He explained his reasons for believing why it would be good if the Czech Republic supported in the Security Council the plan for a possible invasion of Haiti. At the time, I was on holiday, but of course I consulted with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. We spoke on the telephone several times. Afterwards I replied positively. Our delegate in the Security Council voted for the invasion, but this does not mean that we want to take an active military part in this invasion. We agreed that for many reasons this would not be proper. At most, some humanitarian help in the last stages could be considered.

My view was identical with the view of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs on this matter, and there was no difference of opinion with Mr. Prime Minister, either. We also discussed the matter on the telephone and had identical views. The stand of the Czech Republic was expressed during the vote in the Security Council, and, at the same time, we agreed to maintain a cautious attitude as far as our possible participation in any military action was concerned. At this point, I would like to say that I greatly appreciate President Carter's mission, and I firmly hope it will develop well and without loss of life and that the inauguration of a legally elected President Aristide will be the first step toward the gradual renewal of democracy in Haiti.

[Klaus] May I only add that (?Carter was just in Haiti) and, in this respect, we have been in contact with Mr. President, and our views are really totally identical. Mr. President was in contact with President Clinton and I was in contact with Vice President Al Gore, and these matters were coordinated. [passage omitted]

President Havel Appoints New Defense Minister

LD2209172494 Prague Radiozurnal Radio Network in Czech 1500 GMT 22 Sep 94

[Text] [Announcer] In the presence of Prime Minister Vaclav Klaus, President of the Republic Vaclav Havel today appointed Vilem Holan as defense minister. On the line from Prague Castle is Eva Hulkova:

[Hulkova] Following the formal ceremony that ended a moment ago, Vaclav Havel said that Vilem Holan would apparently be a less visible and clearly more civilian minister, with copious natural authority.

He also said that the Czech Republic had adopted the standard customs of democratic states, which means, among other things, that the ministry is headed by a political figure.

Vaclav Klaus added that not everything from the past had yet been overcome and sorted out at the ministry and that the Defense Ministry was not a simple one.

Vilem Holan cited four points underpinning his ideas about the work he was about to embark upon: to complete the transformation of the Army into an effective force; to manifestly work for the integration of the Czech Republic into NATO; to give back to the Army the honor it deserves; and to take all steps possible to ensure that mothers who send their sons to perform national service need not be afraid.

Holan Appointed by Klaus

LD2309095594 Prague Radiozurnal Radio Network in Czech 0900 GMT 23 Sep 94

[Text] This morning, Prime Minister Vaclav Klaus inaugurated the new minister of defense, Vilem Holan.

President of the Republic Vaclav Havel appointed him in place of the recalled Antonin Baudys.

The newly appointed minister said that the main points he wanted to strive for in his office were completing the transformation of the Army, improving the efficiency of the armed forces, and taking steps toward the integration of the Czech Republic into NATO.

Havel Insists on Putting State Above Parties

AU2309110494 Prague LIDOVE NOVINY in Czech 13 Sep 94 p 5

[Article by Czech President Vaclav Havel: "Amnesia?"]

[Text] I recently saw a television debate of two intelligent men, theater experts, whom I hold in high esteem. One of them holds an important political office, the other does not. These discussants also gave some of their attention to me as they answered the question of what they thought about relations between the prime minister and me, and our difference of opinion. They spoke wisely and interestingly. Nonetheless, I was overcome by a curious kind of awe; one could say I was almost shocked. These two people, although well acquainted with the course of affairs in our country and my views, succumbed to one of the contemporary journalistic cliches and agreed, as a matter of fact, on something that is beginning, I am sorry to say, to border on falsification of history—namely, both of them endorsed the remarkably absurd claim that could be summarized in a nutshell thus: Havel contrived a certain political doctrine called "apolitical politics,"

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which is based on the idea of the nonexistence of political parties, and endowed with it the Civic Forum [OF] (political movement that spearheaded the formation of the new government following the collapse of communism in 1989). OF then collapsed because the aforementioned doctrine proved to be a utopia. The reality won—that is, the system of political parties, i.e., not apolitical politics but political politics. Havel—they did not verbalize this; it is my own addition—remains in current politics only as a certain sad memento of a long-collapsed doctrine.

My God, how much nonsense can be compressed into a single claim! I do not want to overestimate my power and do not believe I could vanquish a generally accepted myth by some disclaimer. Nevertheless, I would like to at least briefly set this right. After all, if the most accomplished pundits begin to succumb to the general delusion, a comment is warranted.

1) I have used the notion of "apolitical politics" about twice, each time in quotation marks, 15 or more years ago, when I attempted to explain by means of semimetaphoric expressions the purpose of the dissident efforts as endeavors, which do not and cannot immediately enter politics as the sphere of execution of power (it is apolitical in this sense), whose moral ethos and consistently civic dimension have, however, because of the specific nature of the totalitarian situation, their indubitable political effect. This type of thought, building on Patocka [the philosopher Jan Patocka], may, in a certain way, have influenced Charter 77's self-reflection. That is all. Thus, neither doctrine, nor ideology, nor instructions on how to administer a democratic society, and even less some program of OF. If OF had even remotely anything to do with this, perhaps only that, in its beginnings, the movement bore within itself the spirit of tolerance and solidarity that was characteristic of Charter 77.

2) On the other hand, it is true, and I have never changed my mind in this respect, that I have always stood against the hypertrophied role of political parties, the parties owing the state, and for a very diverse, multilayered, and heterogeneously structured civic society, in which parties play only the role that is appropriate for them. This conviction of mine does not, however, have anything to do with "apolitical politics" in the sense I once used this term.

3) I have always understood OF as an altogether temporary and makeshift revolutionary grouping of all antitotalitarian forces that emerged as a powerful counterbalance to monolithic communist power and as having only a bridging role: Its task was to break the totalitarian supremacy and open space for democracy, including the creation of diversely oriented political parties. I repeated many times (even at the OF congresses) that the shorter the existence of OF, the better. Originally, I even opposed its running in the first free election and thereby assuming for a certain time the role of a political party, which it neither was nor could be. In my perception, its purpose was only to make this election possible and guarantee it as a truly free competition of political parties. If I was a utopian, then only in the following point: I did not realize that no meaningful spectrum of political parties can be completely formed so fast—that is, within just half a year between the revolution and the election, and, therefore, it could not be avoided that the role of the main political force striving for democracy and entering in the election in 1990 was still played by OF, provided, of course, that it would soon subdivide into various parties. At the time, I also pushed through the reduced two-year term of office. I was aware of the urgency of the partition of OF and formation of ordinary parties, and of the foolishness of any attempt on the part of OF (plus the Public Against Violence movement [VPN, OF's equivalent in Slovakia], which was a similar case) "to rule" for the entire four years as a party-nonparty, internally divided into various currents. It could not work in practice, and, most likely, sooner or later the situation would result in an early election. This calculation proved correct: As expected, OF soon began to divide, and full-fledged parties that emerged from the movement could take part in the next election two years later. Thus, in plain terms, without OF, there would not be the Civic Democratic Party [ODS] that won the 1992 election, which originally emerged from the attempt to transform OF into a party (after all, Vaclav Klaus was the first OF chairman!). Hence, the victory of the ODS was not the defeat of OF, which no longer existed at the time, but, rather, the victory of one powerful and politically defined part over other parts otherwise political defined (or undefined).

4) The claim that OF failed is nonsense also for many other reasons. If people join for a certain purpose (in the given instance, to overthrow communism and create conditions for democracy), then achieving the given objective is quite clearly their victory, and they can separate again to pursue their own affairs. On the other hand, it would be a defeat for OF if it still continued to exist today in its all-embracing revolutionary form and was not replaced by ordinary parties because it would mean that OF had not attained its objective. OF and the VPN in Slovakia won runaway victories in the 1990 election, and, therefore, a systematic building of a democratic system could begin with the calm creation (or restructuring) of political parties as its elements. That is not a failure but a success for which all of the parties currently operating on the Czech and the Slovak political scenes should be grateful to OF and the VPN. Moreover, although OF was not a defined political party and associated within itself very different people, who soon became mutual political adversaries, it was precisely the "government" of OF and the VPN that managed to create the conditions for all of the most important transformation changes—above all, economic ones—that are being implemented in both post-Czechoslovak republics today. After all, the fundamental privatization laws were all adopted under the Calfa government, the small-scale privatization took place then, the large-scale

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privatization began, the new taxation system was drafted under this government, restitution laws were adopted, and, in fact, our entire legal system began to transform. It was also at this time that the international status and authority of Czechoslovakia as a truly independent democratic state was revived, a status on which both republics could easily build. These are not bad results considering the conglomerate of people in power who were so politically different, and whoever speaks of some failure apparently knows or wants to know nothing of our post-November [1989] history. To link the end of OF to the "apolitical politics," then, does not make any sense at all. OF did not win the 1992 election because, fortunately, it no longer existed. At any rate, who of the people forming the present government coalition did not start his political career in OF? Apart from the Christian and Democratic Union-Czechoslovak People's Party, we would have a hard time finding anyone.

To sum up: Havel did not contrive any political doctrine of "apolitical politics" as some system without political parties, did not force it on the Civic Forum, and the Civic Forum did not collapse as a result. Not a single part of this claim is based in truth. The Civic Forum fulfilled its role well and, having done so, ceased to exist. A part of this role was also to create conditions for the emergence of a pluralist political system. We are all (to be precise, almost all) enjoying its existence today. Moreover, if Havel (proposed for the post by the present government coalition) is president, it is not a reward for the failure of some political doctrine of his. He certainly is his own man and will remain one, which means, among many other things, that he will continue to challenge any attempt at placing parties above the state. Of course, he is not an enemy of the middle class (as he was described by one of the discussants), either. He is only an enemy of provincial myopia. Incidentally, one of its symptoms is also the phenomenon called amnesia.

Klaus Warns Against 'Demonizing' Russia

AU2209172494 Prague LIDOVE NOVINY in Czech 16 Sep 94 pp 1, 3

[Interview with Czech Prime Minister Vaclav Klaus by Adam Cerny; place and date not given: "Russia Should Not Be Pigeonholed in a Separate Drawer"]

[Excerpts] [Cerny] Some misunderstandings regarding Czech foreign policy could be caused by the fact that it is expounded on the outside by the president, the prime minister, and the foreign minister. How are the powers defined and divided in this area?

[Klaus] I do not want to discuss the division of powers. I rather believe it necessary to reject the incessant attempts to define in detail the powers in this area. It is not possible.

I would perceive it as a problem if a fundamental divergence occurred in these matters. Most of our foreign policy players always take part in government sessions, and their views are continually exchanged on these occasions. I believe that we know one another's opinions well. Regarding contact with the president in this area, I can only say that it certainly exists. Just today, for instance, I had a long telephone conversation with the president about a significant foreign political issue, mutual harmonization and agreements. [passage omitted]

[Cerny] In your article published earlier this week by the British THE ECONOMIST, you wrote about the mistake of demonizing Russia and overlooking Russia's stabilization instincts. What instincts do you have in mind, and which political forces embrace them?

[Klaus] At the most diverse foreign political meetings in the West, when the debate turns to Russia, they always turn to us to ask what we think about it because we were closer and should understand the issue better. My standard theme is a warning against segregating Russia into a completely different drawer, as something incompatible and incomparable. I admit that, when the Zhirinovskiy phenomenon appeared, some said: "So we were right!" I used to say: "Yes, Zhirinovskiy's meteoric rise weakens and complicates my argument. Nevertheless, it does not quash it." If we look at things today, one year since Zhirinovskiy appeared, I would almost believe that I had been right and that his star has moved somewhere other than where it shone last fall.

It still is necessary to stand up against this demonization because it does not lead to seeking any rational approaches.

Experts Criticize Decision on MiG Aircraft

AU2209135994 Prague CESKY DENIK in Czech 6 Sep 94 pp 1-2

[Aarticle by "jis, CTK": "The Army Reportedly Wants To Modernize Aircraft That Have No Chance of Being Accepted by NATO"]

[Text] Prague—The Czech Army's MiG-21 Fishbed interceptor will probably not be accepted for service in NATO units, even after modernizing adjustments, a source close to manufacturers of military aircraft told CTK yesterday. According to the Defense Ministry, even the least expensive alternative of modernizing the MiG-21 should meet the criteria of the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO). However, according to the arms manufacturers, this is not decisive for aircraft that should be compatible with NATO components. The plane should also meet specifications such as being able to use NATO ammunition, land on their bases, use fuel used by the alliance, etc.

According to aviation specialists, it would be much more advantageous to adjust the existing aviation equipment of the discarded but more modern 10 MiG-29 Fulcrums that are in possession of the Czech Army than to invest in modernizing the approximately 30-year-old MiG-21's. The ministry argues that operating the MiG-29's is

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very expensive and that they come from a country with an unstable political situation. The MiG-29 was included in the arsenals of Poland, Hungary, and he former German Democratic Republic (here, the aircraft have been transferred into the arsenal of unified Germany). From a long-term viewpoint, the MiG-29 has the prerequisite to serve in the Army for at least 30 years, unlike the MiG-21, whose "days are numbered," according to aviation experts. According to the Defense Ministry, this is a very simplified view of the problem. When selecting machines designated for modernization, a number of factors must be taken into consideration, including the number of aircraft the Army owns and their combat capabilities. As the Defense Ministry stated further, no one knows what specifications the reconstructed aircraft should actually meet. The Defense Ministry is planning to issue in the immediate future a more detailed standpoint on the modernization of the MiG-21 aircraft.

Report Examines Army Transformation Process

AU2209135494 Prague HOSPODARSKE NOVINY in Czech 12 Sep 94 p 7

[Article by "joe, top": "In the New System of Management, Spending of Every Koruna Will Be Clear-Cut"]

[Excerpts] [Passage omitted]

Reduction According to Agreed Guidelines

The reduction of the military potential of the postcommunist countries is undoubtedly one demonstration of the new political situation in the world. [passage omitted]

According to the agreed-upon [Vienna Convention] guidelines, after the partition of the Czech and Slovak Federal Republic, the limit on the strength of the Army of the Czech Republic (ACR) is 93,300 men (the limits imposed on arms and machinery are documented in the table).

Quantitative Level of ACR Arms and Machinery as Set Out in Treaties

Combat tanks	957
Armored combat vehicles	1,367
Artillery systems	767
Combat aircraft	230
Combat helicopters	50

According to our military experts, however, the total figures for the ACR will be markedly lower—approximately 65,000 men. It is expected that this strength will be achieved as early as 1995.

Direction of the Transformation

Next to the reduction of strength and equipment, the principles of the ACR's transformation are as follows: transition from the divisional structure common in the Warsaw Pact to the brigade system of Western armies, a gradual increase in the proportion of professional soldiers (the ACR should be semiprofessional), a more effective distribution of the troops throughout the Republic, and, especially, the attainment of compatibility with NATO armies.

Modernization

The current technical equipment of the ACR has been classified for the purpose of modernization into four categories: 1) equipment and arms with specifications comparable to the standards of Western countries, 2) arms usable after partial modernization, 3) useless ordnance that has to be replaced, 4) systems that have not yet been in the ACR. The first group includes the L-39 training aircraft, for instance, or the T[illegible]15 truck, and the second includes, among other thin[illegible]e T-72 tank, and the Su-25 and Su-22 aircraft. T[illegible] MiG-23 aircraft, numerous communication technology items, and so forth will probably be withdrawn.

One could say that, at this time, the modernization plans are most manifest in the Air Force. The already completed purchase of domestically produced Z-142 aircraft should be followed by the purchase of L-159's, also of domestic provenance, then, in turn, combat helicopters and transport aircraft and multipurpose supersonic aircraft (probably in 2000).

According to Defense Minister Antonin Baudys, a rational and, over a certain period, appropriately, distributed modernization will require only approximately 30 percent of the amount that the development and manufacture of new equipment would cost.

Organizational Changes

The reduction of the strength of the ACR is taking place on the one hand by means of reducing units and, on the other, by savings in their internal structure. Since the beginning of July 1993, when the ACR's transformation process began, numerous units have been dissolved or reduced and the freed facilities transferred to the civilian sphere. The Air Force can again serve as an illustration. Of the original 54 operational airports, only 29 will remain—five will be permanent, seven will have permanent airport administrations, nine will have a maintained reinforced surface, and eight will be "grass" ones.

The antiaircraft missile troops are gradually moving from the positional defense system to the system of protection of important regions.

A Chance for Domestic Manufacturers

Although the principle of compatibility of the equipment with NATO standards is emphasized in the context of the modernization of the ACR, it does not mean that domestic production is "out of the game." On the contrary, while the modernization projects imply international cooperation, the final supplier should be a domestic firm. Participation of foreign manufacturers is

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expected, particularly for special equipment (optical electronics, avionics, etc.). It should bridge the weak spots in domestic production and save domestic development costs.

Of course, it must be assumed that not all Army orders will be by their size economically advantageous in terms of production. In such instances, the export prospects for the products will be decisive, and the subcontracting foreign firm will play a positive role here. In placing its orders, the Army will not block the expansion of the market by conceivable additional versions required by another customer.

Economic Limits

Of course, the progress of the ACR's transformation is defined, above all, by economic resources. It is expected that approximately 30 percent of the total funding will go on development (investment) and 70 percent on operational costs. [passage omitted]

A significant economic factor in the ACR's modernization has been the withdrawal of useless arms—on the one hand, revenues from selling them and, on the other, the cost of the destruction of unsalable items (this had amounted to 60 million korunas by March 1994).

A New System of Management

[Passage omitted] At the beginning of next year, the ACR will be introducing a new management system, the so-called PPBS (Planning, Programming, and Budgeting System), used, for instance, by major industrial corporations. In simple terms, this method finds the optimal alternative of spending the funds on the basis of objectivization of expenditures (using double-entry accounting).

The model introduced in the ACR will be based on a priority scale of the individual development programs defined by an analysis of the importance of each program for the attainment of the transformation goal and of the actual financial resources. The program selected will then be maximally economically effective. [passage omitted]

A substantial methodical change will also be the monitoring of the cost basis. Instead of the former systemwide (within the framework of the entire Army or service, etc.) registering of individual expenditure, it will be registered separately by the structural element (a battalion, for instance, will become a separate accounting unit). The comparison of the cost basis and operational significance of an individual Army element for the final goal of transformation will then determine its priority in the appropriate development program.

Main Types of Combat Equipmentand Arms of the ACR-(number of pieces on 31 Dec 1993)

Infantry	
Tanks	
T-72	522
T-72K	21
Modernized T-54 and T-55 series	401
Command T-54 and T-55 series	13
Total	957
Combat Vehicles and Armored Personnel Carriers	
BVP-1	605
BVP-1K	18
BVP-2	187
VPZV	129
BRM-1K	15
OT-90	413
Total	1,367
Artillery, Rocket Launchers, and Mine Launchers	
H-12-mm D-30	152
Sh-2S-1-Gvozdik	98
152-mm SkH-DANA	274
122-mm RM	150
122-mm mine launcher	93
Total	767
Aircraft and Helicopters	
MiG-21	62
MiG-23	52
MiG-29	10
Su-22	34
Su-25	25
Z-142	5
L-29	34
L-39	39
An-12	1
An-24	3
An-26	4
An-30	1
Tu-134	1
Tu-154	1
L-410	18
Il-14FG	1
Mi-2	33
Mi-8	8
Mi-17	33
Mi-24	36

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CSOB To Obtain $50-Million Syndicated Loan

AU2309074594 Prague HOSPODARSKE NOVINY in Czech 20 Sep 94 p 1

[Article by "fr": "The CSOB Successfully Releases a Test Balloon on International Money Markets"]

[Text] Prague—The Czechoslovak Foreign Trade Bank (CSOB) is expected to obtain in the near future a five-year syndicated loan of $50 million. As CSOB board member Stanura told correspondents yesterday, the London Sumitomo Bank is responsible for organizing the syndicate. A CSOB presentation took place in London last week for the parties interested in syndicate membership, and, according to Stanura, there was extraordinarily large interest—a total of 50 banks took part in the presentation. The closing date for subscribing to the loan is 30 September, but the Sumitomo Bank has already officially inquired whether the CSOB would be willing to accept a loan of $75 million.

The CSOB should be obtaining the loan at an exceptionally low interest rate for a postcommunist country—that is, LIBOR (London Interbank Offered Rate) plus 0.7 percent. Stanura pointed out Hungary, which is currently trying to obtain a $300-million credit and offers interest payments of LIBOR plus 1.75 percent. Moreover, that is a government credit, while the CSOB is borrowing as a private entity. According to Stanura, however, there are three positive factors in the instance of the CSOB. First, the Czech Republic as a whole is reporting favorable macroeconomic figures. Moreover, the foreign partners appreciate the present situation of the CSOB that restructured its portfolio and recently issued 6 billion korunas worth of 11.125-percent bonds. The Czech banking sector then, according to Stanura, has not suffered much in the eyes of the foreign bankers through the recent failures of smaller banks.

Together with the aforementioned bond issue, the planned loan will facilitate a 1-percent reduction within one or two months in the interest rate charged on new medium-term credits. Part of the syndicated credit will be used to finance Czech exporters. However, the loan, according to Stanura, is only a certain "test balloon" inasmuch as syndicated credits of $100 million or more are common abroad. Hence, new loans will have to be organized for conceivable financing of exports of large investment complexes. Stanura mentioned the possibility of building a power plant in China. It is precisely there and to other countries of Southeast Asia that the CSOB will send its representative within the framework of the trade mission accompanying Prime Minister Vaclav Klaus at the beginning of October.

Dlouhy Rejects Polemics Around Aero Vodochody

AU2209124994 Prague LIDOVE NOVINY in Czech 10 Sep 94 p 1

[Article by "(gag)": "Worries About the L-159 Are Allegedly Unnecessary"]

[Text] Prague/Vodochody—Vladimir Dlouhy, minister of industry and trade, considers as unfortunate the polemics surrounding the trade activity of Aero Vodochody, particularly the deliveries of 36 planes to Thailand. According to him, the published data are damaging to the reputation of the world's largest manufacturer of training jets.

The minister has information available that allegedly makes it possible to explain the course of action taken by the chief of Aero Vodochony, Zdenek Chalupnik, in 1990, when an Israeli arms manufacturer, Elbit, was selected to deliver electronic equipment for the unsalable made-for-Russia planes. Moreover, according to Dlouhy, Elbit has met Aero halfway as regards credit and technical support. Despite the fact that Aero sells its products to the Eagle Group company (representing Elbit in the Czech Republic)—one interceptor for $1.3 million—and this company sells it to Thailand for $4.8 million, we succeeded in increasing the profit from the sales tenfold compared with 1989, according to Dlouhy. The profit at that time was 570,000 korunas. Nevertheless, the minister entrusted his people in the Aero Holding management to provide him with the facts on the Thailand contract. He also intends to address the control department of the Ministry of Industry.

Dlouhy has confirmed the agreement in opinion with the Army regarding the course of action apropos of the several times postponed selection of a strategic partner for avionics for the L-159 combat plane that is being developed. The experts consider it to be one of the most promising projects of the Czech industry. High officials from the Army and people from the Aero technical team expressed serious worries in the past about the fate of the L-159. However, Dlouhy considers them exaggerated. According to him, a meeting of ministers has considered documents provided by an expert commission and also political implications of the selection of a supplier of the dashboard electronics (the U.S. firms Rockwell, Allied Signal, and Elbit are being considered). Dlouhy received warning signals about Areo deals at the beginning of the year. According to him, he has every time asked representatives of the ministry in the Aero holding management whether Chalupnik's course of action was transparent enough for the Czech Republic's bodies. He has always been assured that it was.

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IAEA Mission Visits Bohunice Power Plant

AU2209165694 Bratislava PRAVDA in Slovak 17 Sep 94 p 3

[Article by "(lr)": "Bohunice Has Passed Muster"]

[Text] Jaslovske Bohunice—Following their 12-day mission to the V-2 nuclear power station in Jaslovske Bohunice to verify its safety, the experts from the Vienna-based International Atomic Energy Agency [IAEA] referred to several good practices that could be recommended to other power stations.

The mission took place at the request of the Slovak Government and is the first event of a broader IAEA program aimed at assisting the countries operating this kind of power station. According to the preliminary findings submitted by the mission yesterday to the SEP-EBO [Slovak Energy Enterprises-Bohunice] management and the Office for Nuclear Safety, the V-2 nuclear power station, compared with the older stations with VVER-440 [water-moderated water-cooled power] reactors, has a design containing the majority of the safety requirements normal in Western power stations constructed at the same time. This includes, for example, a fully independent emergency system for cooling the active zone [aktivna zona] capable of dealing with a theoretical accident involving the rupture of the largest pipes.

The aim of the mission, however, was not only this satisfying, though by and large expected, statement. On the contrary, it was oriented, first and foremost, toward the weak spots in the "safety technology" and its operation in terms of the most up-to-date international safety standards. According to Jozef Misak, chairman of the Office for Nuclear Supervision, it has become the international norm that the operation of nuclear power stations must embrace the systematic tightening up of safety systems to the standards set by the most recent requirements. In this sense, the "construction" of nuclear power stations is in fact only completed with the expiration of their physical service life. The V-2 power station in Jaslovske Bohunice did not lag far behind even in this respect. On the contrary, the mission referred to the considerable effort to improve the original design, including the installation of complete new nuclear-safety systems. Certain shortcomings in the original design arising from the lack of specific nuclear standards when the design was conceived in the former USSR have still not been eradicated, however. The experts—from Finland, France, Germany, Spain, and the United States—particularly emphasized the so-called classification of the components and instruments with regard to possible seismic incidents or, as the case may be, to conditions for working in the environment after an accident. The IAEA mission recommended that the methodology for an analysis of accidents and a program for inspections in the core circuit of the reactor during its operation be finalized.

The mission's members consider as one of the essential findings that the need to systematically improve the power station's safety systems has become sufficiently fixed in the minds of the V-2 personnel and has been expressed in the implementation of a special program for improving safety.

Kanis, Kovac Receive French Admiral Lanxade

LD2209203594 Bratislava STV 1 Television Network in Slovak 1730 GMT 22 Sep 94

[Excerpts] Admiral Jacques Lanxade, chief of staff of the French armed forces, arrived in Slovakia today for a four-day official visit. At General Milan Rastislav Stefanik Airport in Bratislava, he was welcomed by General Jozef Tuchyna, chief of staff of the Slovak armed forces, in the presence of the French ambassador to Slovakia, Michel Perrin. [passage omitted]

Adm. Lanxade was later received by Minister of Defense Pavol Kanis. They agreed on the possibility of organizing joint military exercises in 1995, mainly in the spheres of the Air Force and the Army. This will all be decided by a mixed French-Slovak commission of experts at the end of October.

At a meeting with journalists, Adm. Lanxade emphasized the French attitude to the entry of the Visegrad Four members to NATO. He said that it will be an individual process dependent on the development of individual countries, mainly in the economic field. Kanis pointed to great similarities of the two sides on European security.

In the afternoon, Adm. Lanxade was received by Slovak President Michal Kovac. They exchanged views on the situation in their respective countries. Michal Kovac emphasized that there is sufficient mutual trust and that he greatly appreciated the many contacts between the representatives of both Armies.

Tomorrow, Adm. Lanxade will hold talks at the Slovak Army's headquarters in Trencin.

Defense Ministry Makes New Appointments

AU2209173094 Bratislava OBRANA in Slovak 10 Sep 94 p 2

[Unattributed report: "Personnel Changes"]

[Text] A working meeting took place at the Slovak Defense Ministry on 31 August 1994. In the course of the meeting, an order was issued on the reorganization of the Slovak Defense Ministry, the Slovak Army Command, and their subordinated units. The main change is the establishment of a Slovak Army General Staff. The Slovak president appointed Colonel General Jozef Tuchyna to the post of Army chief of staff. The Slovak defense minister appointed by his personal order No. 231 of 26 August 1994 the following officers to the leading posts at the Slovak Defense Ministry:

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Major General Leopold—director of the Logistics Section at the Slovak Defense Ministry

Colonel Professor Dr. Petr Bartak, Doctor of Science—director of the Social and Humanitarian Affairs Section at the Slovak Defense Ministry

Colonel Jozef Zadzora, Candidate of Science—director of the Economic Policy Section at the Slovak Defense Ministry

General Staff Colonel Milan Stranava—deputy director of the Defense Policy and Army Development Section at the Slovak Defense Ministry

General Staff Colonel Marian Miklus—deputy director of the Logistics Section at the Slovak Defense Ministry

Lieutenant Colonel Milan Kardos—deputy director of the Economic Policy Section at the Slovak Defense Ministry

Colonel Ludovit Gal—deputy director of the Foreign Relations Section at the Slovak Defense Ministry

General Staff Colonel Milan Podhoranyi—director of the Defense Minister's Inspectorate

Colonel Jozef Hajas—deputy director of the Defense Minister's Inspectorate

Colonel Professor Dr. Andrej Drab, Candidate of Science—director of the Office of the Slovak Defense Minister.

Jan Fule Commentary on Kovac-Meciar 'Duel'

AU2309111094 Bratislava NARODNA OBRODA in Slovak 21 Sep 94 p 3

[Commentary by Jan Fule: "Michal Kovac Defended the President of the Republic. Did He Choose the Right Moment?"]

[Text] In case there is someone to whom it is still not evident, it will be appropriate to say it right at the beginning: If there is something this election is all about, it is about an attempt to change the parliamentary system and replace the head of state. While you would look in vain for such intentions in any election program, nevertheless, this is a fact.

Until yesterday, the Slovak president was only a passive target of the election campaign of the Movement for a Democratic Slovakia [HZDS] leadership. Yesterday he himself actively joined the campaign and, one must add, in a quite unfortunate manner. His confession that not each step taken by his office was faultless was futile. Michal Kovac defended the president of the Republic at the least appropriate place, among his own eastern Slovak fellow countrymen. Returning once again to 11 March [date of dismissal of the Meciar-led government] or to public opinion surveys, which may not what the president expected, is unproductive at this moment. Persuading the persuaded with arguments that have long been accepted by everyone who wants not only to believe but also to know is a waste of time and amounts to surrendering one's trump cards to the adversary's hands.

The situation has come to a head. The forthcoming elections will bring an answer to the question of which of the erstwhile HZDS fellow pilgrims will remain on the political scene. It is obvious that they both cannot remain there, and they both have problems coming to terms with this fact. Vladimir Meciar is talking at rallies about five ways of the president's "departure," although he himself must have known for a long time now that, if one of them is realistic, it is that Michal Kovac will not be able to endure the attacks on himself and his family and will resign voluntarily. When the twice former premier summons his courage at election rallies with rhetoric about installing once again a one-color government, he is only twisting the reality. It is surprising that the president of the Republic has chosen a similar method and also attempted to boost his self-confidence, eroded by public opinion polls and by a few journalists in one daily and one weekly, at a rally.

The real showdown awaits the two key figures in the coming election after the election. This duel will be very different from that waged at public rallies and from a distance. It is obvious even now that this will be an affair requiring strong nerves. HZDS voters have apparently realized that voting for Vladimir Meciar is tantamount to voting for the removal of Michal Kovac. The HZDS chairman also surely knows that, in the event of an election outcome such as that suggested by the latest public opinion polls, he will have to capitulate, for the first time, in a duel that he so much cherishes—either him or me.

It is scarcely comprehensible, also in the light of these facts, why the president of the Republic let himself be carried away by the campaign launched against his person and by the results of public opinion polls and needlessly devoted one speech to himself.

Moravcik on Privatization of Armament Plants

LD2209162994 Prague Radiozurnal Radio Network in Czech 1400 GMT 22 Sep 94

[Text] It is realistic to privatize Slovak armament factories only after there has been a certain resumption of armament production. Slovak interest in resuming this production is motivated purely by economic considerations, Slovak Prime Minister Jozef Moravcik said in Banska Bystrica today. He added that those armament companies engaged in civilian production cannot be earmarked for privatization until the basic concept of armament production is resolved. He said that the whole process should be prepared in several months' time.

The government has allegedly already approved a three-stage plan for the privatization of armament companies. This plan includes a revitalization of these companies.

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Prime Minister's Advisory Board Members Resign

LD2209210894 Budapest Kossuth Radio Network in Hungarian 1900 GMT 22 Sep 94

[Text] Three members of the prime minister's advisory board—Laszlo Lengyel, Csaba Gombar, and Andras Brody—have resigned. This was announced after a meeting of the board, but no details were given about the resignations. Laszlo Lengyel and Csaba Gombar had earlier objected to the fact that several of the advisors had interests in certain companies.

The remaining members of the body emphasized in a statement that they will fulfill their advisory role on the basis of their scientific or economic management experience. They have no authority to make decisions and receive no separate remuneration for their work.

Committee Discusses Army's Financial Plight

LD2109192394 Budapest Kossuth Radio Network in Hungarian 1600 GMT 21 Sep 94

[Text] The National Assembly's Defense Committee has discussed the Army's bad financial situation at a closed session. The Defense Committee's special subcommittee, which was put in charge of the investigation into the affairs of the Military Security Office, is currently hearing the former defense minister Lajos Fur. Kata Peli Nagy reports.

[Peli Nagy] The army's chief of staff is expecting a lot from the new Defense Committee. Colonel General Janos Deak asked the committee's support in order to be able to spend at least 3.5 billion forints for military industry products. The 1994 supplementary budget and the planned 1995 budget put the Army into an impossible situation and, through this, a part of the Hungarian industry relying on it.

Following the closed session Imre Mecs, committee chairman from the Alliance of Free Democrats [SZDSZ], said that it seemed at the moment that, for example, Danube Aircraft Factory [Dunai Repueloegepgyar] would not receive any order from the Ministry of Defense next year. This will cause a loss of about 600-800 million forints in the company's revenue. This can be fatal.

From about 100 billion forints the Army could maintain its technical and staffing level. In contrast with this, it turned out from the coordination talks with other ministries that it can receive maximum 66 billion forints. They are short of money but they have to provide continuous air-space patrolling, catering, clothing and training. These tasks cannot be harmed. It is not clear yet from where smaller or larger amounts can be withdrawn. There is no medium-term crisis management plan prepared for the time being.

The Defense Committee has decided, for the time being, that with the participation of four ministries—the Ministries of Labour, Industry and Trade, Infrastructure and Defense—joint talks will be held to improve the situation that has evolved.

Following the closed session, the committee has started the hearing of Former Defense Minister Lajos Fur. For the time being Fur has declined to comment on the question whether he had ordered Karoly Gyaraki [former Military Security Office head] to carry out a personal investigation, which is considered to be unlawful. The hearing is still under way.

Isaszegi Interviewed About Military Industry

AU2209102994 Budapest MAGYAR NEMZET in Hungarian 13 Sep 94 p 8

[Report on interview with Janos Isaszegi, head of the Military Industry Office of the Hungarian Industry and Trade Ministry by Zoltan Vereckei; place and date not given: "Government Proposal on the Military Industry Sector—What Is Threatened in the Crisis of the Military Industry?"]

[Text] The elimination of certain military industry capacities would basically question the defense ability of the Hungarian Army, which would also threaten our national security. Therefore, sooner or later, it would become inevitable for Hungary to purchase for hard currency the military equipment that our domestic military industry is still partially capable of supplying—Janos Isaszegi, head of the Military Industry Office of the Hungarian Industry and Trade Ministry, told MAGYAR NEMZET. Janos Isaszegi gave us an interview on the occasion of preparing a government proposal together with his staff.

Speaking about the "Action Program for the Reconstruction and Development of the Hungarian Military Industry," Janos Isaszegi told us that the existence of the Hungarian military industry not only affects the security and independence of Hungary, but also considerably affects our employment policy and our economic situation. Therefore, a decision should be made on the fate of the Hungarian military industry as soon as possible.

Janos Isaszegi mentioned the fact that the industry minister had reminded the defense minister and the interior minister in a letter in May 1994 of the fact that the domestic industry, including the organizations dealing with the development, manufacturing, and repair of military technology, consists of still operational enterprises that retained their professional style. However, the lack of domestic orders and exports affects their management and financial situation. In order to save these enterprises, the Military Industry Office of the Ministry of Industry and Trade carried out a survey among the Armed Forces and Army bodies on the equipment they would need in the short term.

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The requirements were summed up by the heads of the Hungarian Army, the Interior Ministry, the Military Intelligence Office of the Army Chief of Staff, the National Security Office, and the Information Office. So far, the Armed Forces have not received any promises for financing the required military technology from any sources. Therefore, according to the estimation of the Military Industry Office, the implementation of the two-year program would require a state contribution of about 15-16 billion forints. This program would affect 51 firms. The aforementioned office also carried out calculations according to which the net budget expenditure would actually make up only 50 percent of the purchase price. Besides, the state withdraws some 40 percent of the income of the domestic military industry and supplying industry enterprises as a centralized net income through social security, employer and employee payments, personal income tax, pension fund, the value added tax and other taxes and contributions. The budget expenses would also increase by another 10 to 12 percent if the state had to pay unemployment allowances and welfare benefits due to a halt in military industry production.

Janos Isaszegi pointed out that both the Armed Forces and the relevant enterprises will find themselves in a difficult situation if the requirements are not fulfilled immediately, and the government will have to face serious subsistence, defense security, and operational disturbances. At the same time, the military industry enterprises are still capable of manufacturing the required military technology. Several other arguments in favor of creating a 15-16 billion financial support can be brought up. Thus, purchasing arms and military equipment exclusively or mostly from imports would endanger the security of supplies. The fact that complete systems decisive for defense can generally not be purchased and only certain elements of these systems can be purchased from imports is also an argument in favor of domestic production. Another argument is that some domestic military industry products are exportable, and this could contribute to improving our foreign trade balance. Lasting state orders would contribute to the development of support industry and would have a positive effect on the manpower market as well.

Janos Isaszegi pointed out that the organizations authorized to make decisions should acknowledge the serious and occasionally dramatic situation, because the general state of the Army's equipment is extremely serious, an Army that demands an allocation of 10 billion forints. Only a fraction of its demands have been fulfilled in the past four or five years. As a result, some equipment has become almost totally obsolete. The ability of the Hungarian Army to function could be threatened if no change takes place soon.

The collapse of the domestic military industry would also lead to the disintegration of the staff of specially-trained professionals, a staff that is difficult to replace; it would take some five to eight years to train such personnel. Following a decrease in the military industry capacity, the relevant firms will not be able to fulfill the requirements that will emerge in a few years.

Fidesz Questions Success of Goncz's China Mission

LD2209172194 Budapest Kossuth Radio Network in Hungarian 1500 GMT 22 Sep 94

[Text] Having asked Foreign Minister Laszlo Kovacs, the Fidesz [Federation of Young Democrats] parliamentary deputies' group has also put the question directly to President Arpad Goncz as to how successful his human rights mission in China and Indonesia was, as plenty of reports have come from those countries on such rights frequently being violated.

In his letter, the deputies' group leader draws attention to the fact that owing to this violation of rights the European countries are still not treating the PRC as a fully approved partner. Although even prime ministers have visited Beijing since the 1989 events, only the Romanian president had visited China in his capacity as head of state, Jozsef Szajer writes in his letter.

Therefore, the Fidesz deputies' group is certain that when the president, as the representative of the democratic system of the Hungarian Republic, visited those countries, that he was also carrying out some kind of human rights mission.

If Arpad Goncz, an internationally recognized fighter for human and civil rights, who has also been imprisoned by a dictatorship, paid such a spectacular visit to China, it must have a deeper reason, the open letter from the Fidesz deputies' group says.

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Walesa Meets With BBWR Deputies, Oleksy

WS2309094994 Warsaw GAZETA WYBORCZA in Polish 23 Sep 94 p 3

[Article by "(an, dom)": "President Tests Moods"]

[Text] *The president wants to visit the Sejm more frequently and discuss topical issues with political parties. There is unofficial talk that Lech Walesa attaches considerable importance to maintaining good relations with the Nonparty Bloc in Support of Reforms [BBWR] and winning the favor of the Freedom Union [UW].*

The president not only listened to the debate of the National Assembly yesterday, but also met with BBWR deputies, Sejm Speaker Jozef Oleksy, and UW Parliamentary Club Chairman Bronislaw Geremek.

"The president is testing moods in the various parties: who, if anyone, might back him in the presidential election. He is simply collecting votes. He is thinking of gaining new supporters," Lech Falandysz, of the President's Chancellery, told journalists. "The meeting with the BBWR was supposed to be a signal that the president highly values the bloc as his staunchest ally."

Meanwhile, Oleksy stated firmly that the president discussed with him not the election but the "state." "The president also said that he would more willingly stay in parliament and discuss things with parties," he added.

Professor Geremek told journalists, in turn, that he discussed with the president "foreign policy, threats to internal security, and Prime Minister Pawlak's stopping the Mass Privatization Program." Walesa also expressed a desire to meet with the entire UW club.

Politicians in the Sejm are unofficially stressing that Walesa is now going to act as a moderate oppositionist toward the Pawlak government. Along with Foreign Affairs Minister Andrzej Olechowski and UW, he would like to thwart the prime minister and his cooperators' attempts to create a foreign policy that would be independent of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. This is proved by recent foreign visits of the prime minister and Michal Strak, head of the Office of the Council of Ministers.

According to officials in the President's Chancellery, Walesa wants to take advantage of all of his contacts and possibilities of pressure, so that reforms (self-governmental reform, for instance) will be continued and privatization unblocked. If Walesa pulled this off, he would be acclaimed as a defender of reforms and a guardian of a reasonable foreign policy.

Both cooperators of the president and UW politicians admit that, by forming a common front on specific issues, the president is hoping for better relations with UW. He is also trying to take advantage of the fact that UW is today divided on the issue of its candidate for president. Walesa is hoping that, after some indecision, UW will support him.

UW leaders believe, however, that it is still very unlikely that the party will back Walesa in the election.

Candidate for Securities Commission Head Named

WS2309100594 Warsaw RZECZPOSPOLITA in Polish 23 Sep 94 p 1

[Article by K. Grzeg.: "Will Socha Be Paga's Successor?"]

[Excerpt] We learned from reliable sources yesterday that a candidate to become chairman of the Securities Commission is Jacek Socha. He has so far been the deputy of Leslaw Paga, who resigned from his post on 6 September. The motion on Socha's nomination was agreed upon last week by Finance Minister Grzegorz Kolodko and Hanna Gronkiewicz-Waltz, president of the National Bank of Poland. Once it is approved by Prime Minister Waldemar Pawlak, the motion should be submitted within several days to the relevant Sejm committees, which will issue their opinions.

Jacek Socha was born in 1954 in Paczkow, Opole Voivodship. He graduated from the Economic Sciences Department at the University of Warsaw. In the 1980's, he was a scientific employee at the Main School of Planning and Statistics and then in the Economic Sciences Institute of the Polish Academy of Sciences. He has taken part in the transformation of the Polish economic system from the beginning. In 1990, he began work on the team that set up the Securities Committee, where he was nominated as director of the Inspection Office. [passage omitted]

Walesa Proposing Dismissal of KRRiTV Members

LD2309102794 Warsaw PAP in Polish 0933 GMT 23 Sep 94

[Text] Warsaw, 23 Sep—Lech Walesa, president of the Polish Republic, told journalists at the Sejm today that he will ask the Sejm and Senate speakers to consider the dismissal of the National Radio and Television Broadcasting Council [KRRiTV] members appointed by both houses. This morning, the president met with Sejm Speaker Jozef Oleksy.

Asked whether he has candidates in mind to replace Marek Markiewicz and Maciej Ilowiecki, the Council members he has dismissed, he replied: "If I did not, I would not have made such a move." The president added that they are "interesting" candidates and that he, as a politician, thinks that "new times require new people, and there are such people."

Asked whether he is considering bringing the Council members dismissed by him before the State Tribunal, Walesa replied: "I refer this to lawyers."

Asked by journalists about the reasons behind the president's decisions, Lech Falandysz, deputy head of the

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President's Chancellery, said that "it was made easier by the judgement of the Supreme Administrative Tribunal, which ruled that the franchise decision was invalid, even if only in part. This is the most serious infringement of the law. This is even more than a glaring violation of the law. This is simply total lawlessness."

The Supreme Administrative Tribunal ruled on Thursday that the decision granting a franchise to PolSat had been made by the KRRiTV in accordance with the law. The Tribunal found, however, that two of the complaints against the franchise decision presented by Polonia-1, TV-7, and Antene 1 were justified.

Falandysz said this is not the only reason (for the dismissal). "As far as the president knew, the Council committed a number of other violations of the law that might be considered glaring, and the list of the Council's sins has been in the possession of its chairman, Zaorski. The Council is required to act 100-percent legally, which means that franchises must be granted without glaring violations of the law. In the case we are talking about, a legal error of the highest caliber was made," Falandysz said.

Daily Views Sources of Budget-Deficit Financing

WS2309111194 Warsaw RZECZPOSPOLITA in Polish 23 Sep 94 p 1

[Article by K.J.: "Deficit Will Exceed 87 Trillion Zlotys"]

[Text] The Finance Ministry yesterday forwarded to ministers and voivods proposals for their 1995 budgets. On 17 and 18 October, the government will hold a session outside of Warsaw, during which it will decide the final shape of the entire draft for next year's budget.

The budget is still being drafted on the assumption that next year's inflation rate (calculated from December 1994 to December 1995) will amount to no more than 16.9 percent. "It is a very optimistic version, though," Finance Deputy Minister Elzbieta Chojna-Duch stated yesterday. The government envisions that the deficit will remain at the level of 87.8 trillion zlotys [Z].

It is planned that the new stock exchange tax will yield approximately Z800 billion (if we assume that the tax rate will be maximal—0.5 percent). Changes in indirect taxes (VAT, excise) are to yield Z4 trillion and changes in the personal income tax, including higher tax rates, Z10 trillion. In all, the tax changes that have already been approved by the government would yield approximately Z14.8 trillion. On the other hand, however, the ministry must take into account the tax breaks in the personal income tax, which are favorable to taxpayers. These breaks may cost the budget approximately Z3.5 trillion.

If the Sejm does not agree to the tax changes proposed by the government—for example, if it does not pass the law on the stock exchange tax or if other revenue sources fail (for example, if mass privatization, which would yield Z4 trillion to the budget next year, is not started)—the deficit will have to be greater. If, in turn, the government fails to find sources of financing the deficit, it will be necessary to either change taxes once again or cut expenditures. It is also not at all certain how ministers themselves will behave in the governmental discussions on the budget.

The Sejm has three months in which to pass the budget. If we take a look at today's work schedule in the Sejm, it does not look very likely that the budget will be passed anytime this year.

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PUNR, Senators Object to New U.S. Ambassador

AU2209190094 Bucharest Radio Romania Network in Romanian 1700 GMT 22 Sep 94

[Text] A group of Romanian parliamentarians from various parties addressed a message to the U.S. Senate, primarily to Senator Jesse Helms. The document—which bears the signature of Senator Adrian Motiu [senator of the Romanian National Unity Party—PUNR], in his capacity as vice chairman of the Senate Foreign Affairs Committee—refers to the past history and career of Mr. Alfred Moses, in view of his accreditation as U.S. ambassador to Romania.

The appeal states among other things: We write to you as members of Romania's parliament and as representatives of various political parties. As representatives of the Romanian people, we wish to express our indignation over Mr. Alfred Moses' appointment as U.S. ambassador to Romania. Our opposition to this appointment is based on a moral consideration. We would like to corroborate our position vis-a-vis this appointment with two serious arguments: Mr. Alfred Moses was associated with the Ceausescu couple for a long time, something which disqualifies him in the race for the position of ambassador to Romania. Mr. Alfred Moses is not welcome as ambassador to Romania. His presence in our country, in such a position, would recompense those who unscrupulously collaborated with the most dictatorial regime in recent history. Moreover, this accreditation may jeopardize the good relations between our two countries and will undoubtedly fuel extremism in this transitioning region of Europe.

The appeal is signed by Senator Adrian Motiu, vice chairman of the Senate Foreign Policy Commission, and by Messrs. Dumitru Caluianu, senator of the Liberal Party-1993 [PL'93]; Father Matei Boila, senator of the Peasant National Christian Democratic Party [PNTCD]; Ioan Coja, senator of the Agrarian Democratic Party of Romania [PDAR]; Father Emil Roman, PUNR deputy; Archimandrite Simion Tatu, abbot of Panguita Monastery, senator on behalf of the Social Democracy Party of Romania [PDSR]; and Alexandru Popovici, senator on behalf of the Liberal Parliamentary Group.

A telegram received by fax from the PUNR states the following, quote: PUNR assumes full responsibility for the content of this appeal, considering that this issue is not only a matter of national dignity, but goes far beyond the borders of Central and Eastern Europe. It is no secret to anyone that, due to some regrettable errors committed by Western countries in Central and Eastern Europe, only four years after the fall of the Soviet communist bloc the communists have regained power in a number of formerly socialist countries such as Poland, Hungary, Bulgaria, and others. Romania is among the very few countries where this has not yet happened.

Does the United States—through the accreditation of a known collaborator and supporter of the Ceausescu couple—want the same thing to happen in Romania, too? Of course, we cannot believe that. Likewise, we are saddened by the fact that the man who hid from the U.S. Administration the fact that two Romanian priests were killed by torture in communist interrogations has managed to fool the U.S. authorities.

As we have stated on several other occasions, we are sincere friends of the American people, whom we admire and praise. It is because we are such true friends that we have the courage and strength to draw attention to the undesirable mistake that would be made if Mr. Alfred Moses were to be appointed ambassador to Romania.

This fax, received by our editorial board, is signed by Gheorghe Funar, president, Ioan Gavra, vice president, Coriolan Bucur, vice president, and Valer Suian, executive secretary, on behalf of the PUNR Standing Bureau.

Government 'Disapproves' of Senators' Letter

AU2209195294 Bucharest Radio Romania Network in Romanian 1700 GMT 22 Sep 94

[Text] We received by fax the following statement from the Romanian Government:

The Romanian Government views with surprise and regret the position taken by seven senators and deputies—a stance that was also endorsed by the Standing Committee of the Romanian National Unity Party [PUNR]—regarding the appointment of the new U.S. ambassador to Romania. The government disapproves of such actions, which are unique in Romanian political diplomacy and international practice, regarding the designated U.S. ambassador to Bucharest, who, as is known, has received the approval of the relevant Romanian authorities.

The Romanian Government believes that the communiques released by the respective group on this subject represent a lack of lucid political analysis and are capable of negatively affecting Romania's foreign relations as well as misrepresenting our country's image at the international level.

President Iliescu Addresses Minority Issues

AU2309080894 Bucharest DIMINEATA in Romanian 16 Sep 94 pp 1, 2

[Speech by President Ion Iliescu at the international colloquium "Central Europe and Its Minorities," in Bucharest on 15 September: "We Wish To Build a Society of Good Coexistence and Harmony Among All Romania's Citizens—A Society in Which All Citizens Would Enjoy the Fruits of Democracy and Reform—Not To Raise Ethnic Barriers and Administrative Frontiers Between Them"]

[Text] Esteemed parliamentarians and distinguished guests,

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At the opening of this important colloquium, I would like to welcome the presence of parliamentarians from Central European countries and from our country as well as the high-ranking representatives of various international bodies. An open and substantial dialogue on such a hot subject of the political agenda can only be welcome. This dialogue is also necessary in order to formulate optimal solutions still needed in the process of building Europe.

Having lived, throughout the centuries, in a region crisscrossed by many interests, influences, and hegemonic intentions—a buffer zone between the East and West—the nations of Central and Eastern Europe gained their right to organize themselves into independent states at enormous cost. The return now, in this time of transition, of the national ideal and ethnic-oriented trends has deep historical causes, linked to the very nature of the system we have just discarded and to the burdensome file accumulated in modern times. In this respect, the Central European region is far from being an exception. The problem of national, state, ethnic, or religious identity has become a problem in need of new approaches and solutions at the international level.

Unfortunately, geopolitical changes in recent years and the reemergence of the national spirit have generated tensions and conflicts that have again led to blood being shed in this region, where fate has placed us together. Geography and culture have woven solidarity links among us, but historical circumstances have often placed us opposite each other. We must admit that history has not been too generous with the peoples in this part of Europe, but I believe that we have the opportunity to overcome tensions and misunderstandings through a pragmatic tackling of current realities. I believe that, on the brink of the millennium, we cannot solve all these inherited problems by turning to the past. On the contrary, we need contemporary answers, in the spirit of the democratic values and trends toward the construction of a common future, a future of European cooperation and integration, a future that should remake Europe as a unitary civilization zone.

In tackling and solving the problems of minorities, there is already concern about defining the various relevant international standards, but the diversity of historical and geographic situations, traditions, and state structures shows that there is no single model for resolving these matters.

The reality is that there is no ethnically pure state in Europe. There is no state that does not contain ethnic minorities, sometimes called linguistic or religious minorities, or "regional cultures," as there is no national state which does not contain fellow nationals living in the neighboring countries. The solutions adopted in the face of this reality are very diverse. France, for instance, considers its citizenship as the defining element for the relationship between the individual and the state, by granting no relevance whatsoever to a person's ethnicity. Consequently, ethnic minorities, although they are a demographic and social reality, simply do not exist for the French state. At the other pole, there are states where ethnic minorities have been recognized as a reality from the beginning of the modern development of statehood, thus ensuring special conditions for their cultural expression and for maintaining their identity, with Romania being a typical example in this respect.

The unhappy experience of the period between the two world wars, when national minorities living on the territory of other states were used as a pretext for territorial claims and expansion, led the democratic European states, after the war, to include the protection of minorities within the broader framework of human rights protection.

This new approach proved beneficial, judged by the way in which these countries developed and achieved, on the basis of this approach, such historical reconciliations as the one between Germany and France. Certain recent tendencies to use the generous subject of the protection of minorities for political purposes or as an argument for revisionist trends has led to defining the principle according to which the protection of national minorities can only be achieved by actually guaranteeing the basic rights of individuals belonging to those minorities, within the frameworks offered by the current statal organization of Europe and by strictly observing the existing borders. It is not accidental that the Vienna Declaration signed last year during the summit meeting of states belonging to the Council of Europe stipulates that the protection of the rights of persons belonging to national minorities should be made "within the framework of each legal state, by observing the territorial integrity and national sovereignty of the respective states."

Protection of the rights of minorities and their loyalty to the states on whose territory they live, as citizens with equal rights, are inseparable aspects of the same problem. The conjugation of these requirements is the key to understanding and good neighborliness in Central Europe. National minorities have homogeneous historical and cultural traditions and peculiarities that must be protected, because they are an element of cultural and human enrichment for each state and ethnic, national, cultural, and linguistic diversity is a precious thesaurus of the "Europe of nations" as well as an expression of its strength. The effective emphasis on unity with diversity is the realistic platform for developing the European integrationist processes.

In this spirit, adventurist activities to turn ethnically mixed areas into autonomous regions and enclaves cannot offer a better framework for protection than the rule-of-law state can. On the contrary, their acceptance might exacerbate interethnic problems and undermine the territorial integrity of the states, including national and regional security. The isolation of minority groups into autonomous territorial or ethnic units is not a

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democratic and European solution, as claimed by the advocates of this course, at a time when we are witnessing processes of the integration and construction of a united Europe. It would be nonsense if the nations and national states were to draw closer to each other and integrate in supranational forms of cooperation, while the minorities were to follow the opposite course, namely to delimit and separate themselves within the various national states in the name of a misinterpreted autonomy, particularly when the state legislation and structure ensures the implementation of the principles of local autonomy.

Today, we have conditions for building new relations among our states based on principles of good neighborliness. In order to ensure that we do not miss this opportunity offered to us by history, political forces in the Central European states must behave in a responsible manner, based on principles in the relevant European documents.

In this respect, Romania, which returned to the great family of democratic nations after December 1989, adhered to the international documents that stipulate that the rights of minorities are a component of basic human rights and must be tackled from this very strict perspective. We accepted without hesitation not only the requirements imposed by our membership in the Council of Europe, but also all other initiatives aimed at promoting and observing basic human rights and also ensuring, within this framework, the protection of ethnic minorities living in Romania.

The Romanian people are by nature and tradition a tolerant, open, and hospitable people. Romania's new constitution explicitly formulates the rights enjoyed by national minorities. The 14 ethnic minorities in Romania, recognized and registered as such, through their own specific organizations, amount to some 10 percent of the country's population and have an appropriate representation in Parliament—the Hungarian minority has 39 seats; the other minorities have one seat each. Likewise, they are represented in local councils and all public institutions and have complex networks of education in their mother tongue—which are subsidized by the state, including higher education—as well as many central and local publications, radio and television stations, and a panoply of cultural institutions and associations that ensure the free manifestation and assertion of their ethnic identity. There is a Council for National Minorities in the government operating with good results, something that facilitates dialogue and cooperation with the representatives of these minorities in solving their specific problems.

I believe that we have an adequate democratic framework, which we are determined to improve, so as to guarantee these rights. Our constitution stipulates that, in the matter of human rights, international regulations take precedence over internal laws, meaning that we align ourselves without complexes or prejudices to the most exacting international standards. The claims to territorial autonomy based on ethnic principles are unjustified and unacceptable for Romania, given the ethnic composition of the Romanian State—where some 90 percent of the population is Romanian—and its historical, geographical, economic, and demographic makeup. There is no historical province in our country where the Romanians are not the majority of the population, on the whole. The densest concentrations of Hungarian population are in two counties in the center of the country, which are among the counties with the smallest number of inhabitants.

There are still discussions and some discontent regarding the way in which these rights are actually ensured, but this dissatisfaction is equally directed at the economic and social conditions in which all citizens live. We believe that we should use the experience and practice of the states from Western Europe, which, after World War II, realized that an authentic resolution of the problem of minorities can be achieved by promoting economic development and raising the living standard of all citizens. The social and economic difficulties we are facing in the transition process is a favorable framework for the emergence of interethnic conflicts and tensions and of nationalist and xenophobic manifestations. The political forces and institutions of the rule- of-law state, including the representatives of the national minorities, must protect democracy from such practices and oppose more resolutely the political manipulation attempts to which the issue of national minorities can be subjected. To the extent that our countries will manage to overcome these practical difficulties, we will also solve a series of specific minorities claims in the general framework of consolidating the rule-of-law state and the new economic and social environment.

We wish to build a society of good coexistence and harmony among all Romania's citizens—a society in which all citizens would enjoy the fruits of democracy and reforms—not to raise ethnic barriers and administrative frontiers between them. In my opinion, the democratic institutions in Romania have reached the necessary maturity to find the best ways and means to permit the assertion of the cultural, linguistic, and religious identity of the minorities.

I consider this colloquium to be a good opportunity to tackle, in a new spirit of objectivity and thoroughness, the various aspects of this complex problem of ethnic and national identity. Nothing can stand in the way of dialogue and the democratic confrontation of ideas on this subject. We must find the ways and means to protect and preserve the cultural identity of ethnic groups as a treasure of the contemporary world, thus giving a constructive meaning to diversity and positively guiding and organizing their energies so as not to sacrifice either the existing forms of state unity, or the good coexistence and neighborliness arising from human and cultural convergencies and from economic and political cooperation, or their specific ethnic identity, which gives substance and polychromy to the modern world.

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Thank you!

Iliescu Views Privatization, Corruption

AU2209165994

[Editorial Report] Bucharest Radio Romania Network in Romanian at 0742 GMT on 22 September carries a live relay from Cotroceni Union Hall on a news conference by Romanian President Ion Iliescu. According to the reporter, all together about 50 chief editors, directors of various publications, radio and television networks, and news agencies, and foreign correspondents accredited to Romania are present in the hall.

Presidential Counselor Traian Chebeleu invites Iliescu to make an introductory speech.

Iliescu begins his statement by saying that he wishes to be brief because he discussed the major issues of domestic political life and international activity during his recent address in parliament. He says that "the key issue of the current times is to promote actions initiated by the government to stimulate and speed up the process of privatizing state-owned commercial companies." However, he believes that certain attitudes in this respect show that "the essence of this action has not been clearly understood;" namely, that this means "the implementation of the 1991 privatization law in a more rapid manner." He believes that the current situation of financial blockade has to be overcome and "we should obtain some sources of capital to revive, modernize, and restructure enterprises." Iliescu advocates "more direct involvement of the government in this action, and I believe that this is the weak point of the 1991 law, namely, that it marginalizes the government precisely in connection with the essential elements of the economic reform" and with "the issue of updating the evaluation of the social capital of privatized enterprises, something that is natural under inflationary conditions."

Iliescu goes on to talk about further details of privatization included in the "draft law submitted to Parliament by the government." He considers that "it is regrettable that the Democratic Convention of Romania delegation refused the government's invitation to a dialogue. It seems that the position of the government was reasonable. You do not talk to a person who curses you, hurts your feelings, and slanders you. This is a case of correctness and good manners on the part of those who really wish to participate in a dialogue. The government's willingness to hold a dialogue is commendable and I believe that the gates for an imperative and constructive discussion are not closed." Iliescu mentions that "today, very many of those who spoke out in favor of privatization are, in fact, against a concrete program of privatization. But such contradictions often occur in the political game." He expresses his hope that this situation will be overcome.

Next, Iliescu discusses the issue of corruption. He says that "the general concern of the public and the press over this phenomenon is justified" because it is an issue "with broad involvement in our social life" thus "a frontal and radical approach at all levels is required." He says that "the president's constitutional rights are limited" in "getting directly involved" in the fight against corruption but "I will consistently follow the implementation of certain measures taken by the legal, governmental, and penal bodies." Iliescu expresses the belief that "such a process and phenomenon cannot be curbed solely by punitive measures" because the act of curbing corruption is connected with the "revival of the economy and with promoting efficient market economy mechanisms that should limit many sources of corruption, and privatization is one of the key elements of this process."

Iliescu goes on to condemn the widespread phenomenon of trafficking and gives the example of the edible oil shortage, exploited by black marketeers. Iliescu praises the actions of the government in this respect, which took measures against middlemen "who distort economic phenomenon, and this is a genuine economic war on the black marketeers." He advocates the elimination of this phenomenon "from the state apparatus, the central and local public administration, and state dignitaries." He says "we are all responsible before the law, nobody should make any concession to anybody," and corruption of public persons and employees in the central and local administration should be punished "even more severely."

Iliescu condemns accusations that are published in the press, which are simple "diversions and smokescreen that cover the real and serious facts and corruption." He says that groundless and trivial accusations in the press "lessen the authority and credibility of the press. A genuine war against diversionists in the press should be waged and against those who undermine the authority of the press." He hails the fact that "Parliament has chosen to adopt the decision of the European Parliament regarding journalistic ethics" but he wonders why "our papers are in no great hurry to make public the text of this motion, which is necessary, and talks about the duty of the press regarding circulation, the truthfulness of information, the control of information, and the responsibility incumbent on journalists," whose news disseminated "in thousands of copies, becomes a weapon with multiple effects, when it is circulated without any responsibility."

In connection with "proposals for a minimum understanding and political cooperation platform, which is a sort of minimum social pact, I am awaiting reactions from all the political formations on the basis of more careful reflections on my proposals."

On foreign policy issues, Iliescu recalls talks held with Turkish President Demirel in Istanbul and with the Armenian president in Bucharest, expresses hope for a "normalization and stabilization of the political situation" in this region, and advocates "prospects of developing more direct relations among countries in the Black

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Sea region." Iliescu concludes his speech by outlining his future schedule, including his participation in the forthcoming UNGA session in New York and a possible meeting with President Clinton. There then follows a question-and-answer session.

The first question refers to Romania's international activity, to which Iliescu sketches in very general terms Romania's efforts at integration into Western European structures, to cooperate with all states and international institutions, and also to cooperate further in the Black Sea region.

The next two questions are on Iliescu's views on methods to fight corruption and crime in general. On corruption, Iliescu repeats his wish to have a law passed prohibiting officials from also owning businesses or being members of corporation boards. After mentioning Romania's cooperation with international law enforcement agencies, Iliescu outlines the efforts made in the country to increase efficiency and improve cooperation among Romania's own law enforcement agencies. In this context, Iliescu mentions the need urgently to adopt the National Doctrine on Public Order, a document currently being prepared by the Ministry of the Interior.

In connection with his talks yesterday with members of a delegation of Moldova's opposition coalition headed by Moldovan deputy Valeriu Matei, Iliescu says: "I have heard that there has been some reaction to the presence and reception of this delegation, reactions which I consider unfounded. We will always be open and the dialogue of our institutions cannot be reduced merely to dialogue among the forces that rule our countries. Rather, it is our duty to maintain dialogue with all the political forces open, especially considering that we are dealing with responsible individuals who are also members of the Moldova parliament and who in the past have held high office. This does not mean that we are interfering in internal affairs and it does not affect our interstate relations or the institutions of our states, which we intend to keep up." "The dialogue with various political forces is a useful and necessary thing, and therefore I am surprised that certain officials of the Republic of Moldova seem to be unable to comprehend such rules of democracy. It was a mutual briefing, during which they presented the situation in Moldova, the consequences of certain stipulations of their new constitution, which contradict certain historical truths about our nation, namely what the Romanian nation is and what the Romanian language is." Iliescu then adds: "I understand their need to pay attention to the problems of ethnic minorities. A new problem has emerged, as the Russians have become an ethnic minority on the territories of the former Soviet Union that is currently independent states. Of course, one has to consider such issues very carefully. The same sensitivity that in our country is manifested by the ethnic Hungarians—who used to be a dominant nation in the former empire and afterwards became an ethnic minority, and who therefore continuously experience a feeling of frustration—seems to be displayed now by the Russians, who used to be the dominant nation in the former Russian or Soviet empire and now have merely an ethnic minority status in various states. To be concerned with those citizens and ensure their necessary rights to express their identity and their rights to be equal citizens is one thing, but this should not happen to the detriment of one's own dignity, the dignity of one's own nation."

Concluding his assessment of relations with the Republic of Moldova, Iliescu states: "The delegation presented its position and its assessment of those issues over which there is a dispute currently going on in Moldova. However, as I said, this does not affect our relations at the state level, and it would be regrettable if state bodies should try to prevent the normal, natural development of relations with Romania. The independence of the Republic of Moldova in August 1991 was proclaimed with regard to the former empire and not Romania." Iliescu then reiterates Romania's actions to support Moldova politically and economically, both on the bilateral and international planes.

Asked to comment on the presence of U.S. Armed Forces in Haiti, Iliescu says: "Of course, the presence of the U.S. troops in Haiti may be judged from two angles: As an external armed intervention in the internal affairs of a state; however, considering the specific situation created in Haiti by the military junta's forcible ousting of that country's legally elected president, as well as the constant pressure exerted by international public opinion to establish democracy in that country, one can say that there is an international legal covering for such an intervention to reestablish the constitutional rights, the constitutional framework in that country. As everyone has seen, this has happened on the basis of a number of political actions, such as the presence of former President Carter, his talks with the representatives of the military junta, and the creation of a framework to peacefully settle that issue, without military conflict. From this point of view I believe that one should appreciate the positive, constructive aspect of that presence."

Asked by a Hungarian television correspondent about the alleged secret plans of the Romanian Army to repress possible ethnic unrest, Iliescu replies that Defense Ministry State Secretary "Mircea Pascu has personally rejected those allegations and the Defense Ministry Press Office has published a denial. Mr. Pascu has never said such a thing. It was a distortion of his speech, which was of a purely theoretical nature during the symposium on ethnic minorities in Central Europe."

After discussing problems concerning the social protection of the population, Romania's "strategic" geographic position and efforts made to further economic cooperation in the Black Sea region, and the criteria in appointing the country's ambassadors abroad, Iliescu is asked to state Romania's and his own position regarding the "peaceful alteration of state borders." After enumerating the European charters spelling out the inviolability

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of borders and after admitting that there are special exceptions, such as the unification of Germany, Iliescu rejects the idea as a "revisionist thesis trying to revive political situations corresponding to territories and borders of various old European empires."

Nuclear Accident Evacuation Exercise Held

AU2309080394 Bucharest Radio Romania Network in Romanian 1900 GMT 22 Sep 94

[Text] The first exercise to evacuate civilians in the event of a nuclear accident on Romanian territory—staged at the Cernavoda nuclear power plant today—took place between 1100-1200 with the participation of approximately 10 percent of the town's population, that is some 2,800 people. The exercise tested the responsiveness of the Army, units of the Interior Ministry, power plant personnel, local public administration bodies, various institutions, economic units, and the residents of Cernavoda, in case of a major nuclear accident.

The exercise was organized by the General Civil Defense Inspectorate, a body charged with training the population to implement measures stipulated by existing security planning. Defense Minister Gheorghe Tinca, Interior Minister Doru Ioan Taracila, and some 75 representatives from 22 countries participating in the Neptun International Seminar on Civil Protection During the Transition Period, were present in the official stands.

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NATO Aircraft Hit Serb Tank Near Sarajevo

AU2209181594 Paris AFP in English 1754 GMT 22 Sep 94

[Text] Brussels, Sept 22 (AFP)—NATO warplanes bombed a Serb tank near Sarajevo Thursday after a series of Serb attacks on French troops of the UN Protection Force (UNPROFOR), the western alliance announced here.

A statement said the tank was within a 20-kilometre (12.5 mile) heavy weapons exclusion zone declared by the United Nations around the besieged capital of Bosnia-Herzegovina.

"Following a Bosnian Serb attack against a French armoured personnel carrier (APC) today near Sarajevo, NATO aircraft attacked a Bosnian Serb tank which was within the 20-kilometer exclusion zone around Sarajevo," the statement said.

"The attack was carried out by aircraft of NATO operation Deny Flight. The decision to attack was made after the UNPROFOR force commander, General Bertrand de Lapresle and Admiral Leighton W. Smith, CINCSOUTH (commander-in-chief, southern sector), agreed it should be carried out in response to the attack on the UNPROFOR APC."

The North Atlantic Treaty Organisation strike was also announced by the United Nations in New York.

Two French peacekeepers were wounded earlier Thursday by Bosnian Serbs in the course of a series of deliberate attacks on the UN force, a UN spokesman in Sarajevo reported. In one attack, an armoured UN reconnaissance vehicle was targeted in northeastern Sarajevo, and the driver was wounded in the hand, Lieutenant Colonel Bernard Labarsouque said. Labarsouque did not specify what type of weapons had been fired on the UN vehicle, but said they were powerful enough to knock it out of action.

Meanwhile, a UN soldier charged with monitoring snipers was shot by Serbs in central Sarajevo and received a leg wound. The soldier was the first wounded over the past month in the United Nations' effort to protect civilians from sniper gunfire. Serb troops fired on two other armored UN vehicles, one in the center of Sarajevo and one in the southern suburbs, but no injuries were reported, the spokesman said.

The strike took place around 6:20 p.m. (16:20 GMT) and involved an American A-10 and two British Jaguar planes, NATO said.

According to one diplomatic source, it was French General Andre Soubirou, the UN commander in Sarajevo who, in the absence of General Michael Rose, the commander for Bosnia, asked NATO to carry out the strike. Soubirou also asked for and received authorisation for the strike from the UN's representative in the former Yugoslavia, Yasushi Akashi.

A second NATO strike had been envisaged against a Serb military building near Pale, capital of the self-declared Srpska republic of Bosnia, in the event of the first action failing, according to the same source.

This action would have involved British Sea Harrier planes.

Strike Followed Serb Attack

LD2209190494 Belgrade TANJUG in English 1812 GMT 22 Sep 94

["Pool" item]

[Text] Brussels, Sept. 22 (TANJUG)—The NATO Headquarters in Brussels said NATO planes bombed Bosnian Serb positions around Sarajevo on Thursday. No details were given about the effects of the attacks or whether there were any casualties.

The NATO source said a Serb armored vehicle was the target of the attack.

The air strikes followed an earlier alleged attack by Bosnian Serbs on an armored vehicle of the French battalion of the United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR). One soldier was wounded in the attack and two suffered shock.

It was not announced whose planes took part in the action, but Western TV networks said they were American. The media interpreted the attack as an aggravation of the NATO stand towards the Bosnian Serb side and an indication of yet more attacks.

UN Suspends Aid Flights

AU2209172594 Paris AFP in English 1717 GMT 22 Sep 94

[Text] Sarajevo, Sept 22 (AFP)—The United Nations suspended all aid flights into Sarajevo several hours before NATO warplanes bombed a Bosnian Serb tank in the region around Sarajevo, the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) said.

UNHCR spokesman Kris Janowski said the last aircraft landed at the airport at 2:00 p.m. (1200 GMT) and the air-bridge, the only means of regular suppply for the city, was then broken because of Serb attacks against French UN troops.

Serbs Threaten Retaliation

LD2209201694 Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 1955 GMT 22 Sep 94

[Text] Belgrade, 22 Sep (TANJUG)—The information service of the general staff of the Srpska republic army has announced that NATO aircraft carried out an air-strike in the area of the village of Dobrosevici this evening.

A communique forwarded to TANJUG says that "between 1640 and 1710 GMT, NATO aircraft carried

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out a brutal attack on the civilian population in the region of the village of Dobrosevici."

The attack was carried out, the communique goes on to say, following several days of armed provocations by the Muslim forces against UNPROFOR [UN Protection Force] in the Sarajevo area.

"Due to increasingly frequent brutal and completely unprompted attacks by NATO and UNPROFOR against the Srpska republic, which represent direct support for Muslim actions against the Srpska republic, we are compelled to retaliate adequately with the time and place yet to be determined," the communique says.

Intensive Air Activity Reported North of Tuzla

AU2209141494 Paris AFP in English 1314 GMT 22 Sep 94

[Text] Zagreb, Sept 22 (AFP)—About 210 helicopter sorties were observed by UN military observers north of Tuzla in a region controlled by Bosnian Serbs, a UN spokesman here said.

Paul Risley told journalists that these incidents had become more numerous over the past weeks, proof of an "increase of air activity" in the region. Risley could not confirm a NEW YORK TIMES report, citing a UN source in Zagreb, that the choppers came from Serbia.

He said the United Nations did not have the necessary equipment to determine the departure points of the helicopters. He said the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation, whose planes survey the air exclusion zone in Bosnia-Hercegovina, was able to do so. "If NATO is able to establish any such activities, we will be very quick to report that," he said.

UNPROFOR Confirms Flights

AU2209142694 Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina Network in Serbo-Croatian 1300 GMT 22 Sep 94

[Text] Representatives of the UN Protection Force [UNPROFOR] in Sarajevo have confirmed that helicopters have been flying at night from Serbia to the territories under the control of Karadzic's Serbs, but they say that these were isolated incidents.

UNPROFOR spokesman [word indistinct] Spicer denied the claims by some Western papers that a large number of helicopter flights was involved. There have been individual reports about these helicopter flights, this UN officer said. However, he failed to specify the number of flights in question.

New French Commander in Sarajevo Assumes Post

LD2209133194 Paris France-Inter Radio Network in French 1300 GMT 22 Sep 94

[Excerpt] French General Herve Gobilliard, the new commander in chief of the UN troops in Sarajevo, has taken up his post. He replaces General Andre Soubirou who is to leave the Bosnian capital tomorrow. [passage omitted]

Izetbegovic, UN Official Discuss Sarajevo

LD2109223194 Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina Network in Serbo-Croatian 2200 GMT 21 Sep 94

[Text] Alija Izetbegovic, president of the Bosnia-Herzegovina Presidency, today received Sergio de Mello, the head of civil sector of UNPROFOR [UN Protection Forces] for former Yugoslavia. Their talks focused on the situation in Sarajevo which both sides assessed as unsatisfactory. They also examined (?cease-fire around) Sarajevo and (?demilitarization) of that area.

Izetbegovic Receives Saudi Delegation

LD2209001094 Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina Network in Serbo-Croatian 2200 GMT 21 Sep 94

[Text] Bosnia-Herzegovina Presidency President Alija Izetbegovic also received today a delegation made up of members of the high Saudi committee for aid to Bosnia-Herzegovina and members of the Saudi Information Ministry, who have been paying a visit to our country, together with a group of their journalists.

Izetbegovic spoke about the heroic struggle by our young men who, almost unarmed, opposed the fourth [as heard] armed force in Europe and checked its assault on Bosnia-Herzegovina. A number of factors had an influence on such resistance, but one should not forget aid received from our friends from abroad—Saudi Arabia included. The Saudis are paying (?special attention) to our refugees, particularly in Croatia. [Words indistinct] medical protection [words indistinct] and taking care of their education, Izetbegovic stressed. The president recalled that a new surge of evictions of Muslims Bosniaks from the occupied areas was currently under way and that our state was facing the grave problem of their accommodation.

He also recalled that Saudi King Fahd earmarked funds for the construction of a refugee camp in our country nearly two years ago. Unfortunately, although we carried out all the necessary preparations for the realization of that project [words indistinct], Izetbegovic stressed in talks with the Saudi delegation. [passage indistinct]

Karadzic Orders Stop to Emigration Permits

LD2209165394 Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 1540 GMT 22 Sep 94

[Text] Belgrade, 22 Sep (TANJUG)—Radovan Karadzic, president of the Srpska republic, today ordered the Internal Affairs Ministry of the Srpska republic to immediately stop issuing citizens permits to emigrate to the Muslim-controlled territory. His statement, received by SRNA from the Office of the President of the Srpska republic, explains that this order has

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been issued "in connection with the manipulations with the non-Serb population from the area of Bijeljina municipality."

"The Internal Affairs Ministry has been asked to thoroughly investigate the circumstances surrounding the transfer and—if there is evidence of unlawful actions—to set in motion adequate procedures," the statement says.

The Office of the President of the Srpska republic strongly "refutes an increasing number of accusations from the Muslim side, suggesting that this is a matter of ethnic cleansing, something that is allegedly being spearheaded by the authorities of the Srpska republic.

"We want to remind the world public once again of the fact that, despite the agreements reached in Geneva on the freedom of movement of civilians and an overall exchange of populations, the Muslim side has constantly thwarted their implementation, thus subjecting over 200,000 Serbs on the territory under its control to the status of ethnic hostages," the statement says in conclusion.

Srpska Interior Ministry Denies Ethnic Cleansing

LD2209131094 Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 1158 GMT 22 Sep 94

[Text] Bijeljina, 22 Sep (TANJUG)—The Srpska republic Interior Ministry public security center in Bijeljina today again resolutely denied allegations of ethnic cleansing in that city which are, it is stated, "being spread by some international circles and media."

Petko Budisa, assistant head of the Interior Ministry's public security center, particularly stressed that "the state is not and cannot be behind the alleged ethnic cleansing." Budisa said Srpska republic president Radovan Karadzic directly "ordered him to prevent any individual case of Muslims leaving the area in order to prevent the exploitation of economic and family reasons given for their departure from Bijeljina and Janja, and to ensure guarantees of safety for all citizens."

He added that the public security center established that over the past few days "some extremists and criminal elements, in cahoots with the Muslim secret service, carried out the illegal transportation of a large number of young Muslim males capable of being soldiers from Janja to Tuzla via Mt. Majevica."

According to him, there is a confirmed link here with "the order issued by Hazim Sadic, commander of the Tuzla Corps, for the transfer of all Muslims capable of military service from Semberija to Tuzla in order to fill out [Bosnian Government] units before the announced Muslim offensive on Brcko, Majevica, and even Bijeljina."

"Apart from this, the purpose of Sadic's order is to exploit the alleged ethnic cleansing in order to prompt fresh Security Council resolutions against the Srpska republic," Budisa said.

In the Bijeljina public security center they say a detailed investigation was carried out into all these phenomena and that the results will soon be communicated to the public.

Bosnian, Croatian Serbs Discuss Customs Duties

LD2209143394 Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 1355 GMT 22 Sep 94

[Text] Banja Luka, 22 Sep (TANJUG)—A session of the governments of the Srpska republic and the republic of Serb Krajina opened behind closed doors in Banja Luka today. It has been unofficially learned that the session has been convened in order to overcome misunderstandings in connection with the levying of customs duties and excise taxes on goods in transit on their way from Yugoslavia to the republic of Serb Krajina.

Srpska republic prime minister Dusan Kozic said two days ago that the taxes collected on the goods in transit for the republic of Serb Krajina will be sent to the republic of Serb Krajina's bank account, but that the Srpska republic will thus protect itself from the smuggling of goods on its territory.

A statement is expected to be issued after the session.

Croatian Serbs Send Reinforcements to Bihac

AU2209151594 Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina Network in Serbo-Croatian 1300 GMT 22 Sep 94

[Report by Nada al-Isa from Zagreb]

[Text] Milan Martic, president of the so-called republic of Serbian Krajina, has threatened to bomb Zagreb if Croatia takes advantage of current Bosnia-Herzegovina Army 5th Corps successes to attack the so-called Serb autonomous province of Krajina.

The situation is so bad in this so-called Krajina that the information is not for public ears. Even Borislav Mikelic, prime minister of the so-called Krajina, has admitted this to the radio station in occupied Petrinja. In so-called Krajina there is panic and fear of the 5th Corps [words indistinct]. After sabotage units of the 5th Corps penetrated deep into chetnik territory in pursuit of chetniks from the Cazin Krajina to the so-called Serb autonomous province of Krajina, the Serb authorities started mobilizing all men between the ages of 15 and 60. The extent of chetnik fear of the Bosnia-Herzegovina Army can be deduced by Croatian Army observer statements that the chetniks have significantly reduced the strength of units facing the free parts of Croatia and redirected them to Dvor na Uni, where they have also sent five tanks and several guns as reinforcements in clashes with the 5th Corps.

The so-called Serb autonomous province of Krajina is in fact now under siege. On one side there is the Croatian Army, and the Bosnia-Herzegovina Army 5th Corps is

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on another. On a third side are the sanctions that the Bosnian Serbs have introduced against the Croatian Serbs.

Optimists in Zagreb say that the Bosnia-Herzegovina Army has [word indistinct] the aggressor.

Sarajevo Radio Updates Military Situation

AU2309092994

[Editorial Report] Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina Network in Serbo-Croatian at 0800 GMT on 23 September within its regular seven-minute newscast carries several reports on the situation in the republic.

Mirza Sadikovic reports from Bihac that "during the night, but also in the early morning hours, joint aggressors continued their bestial attacks on the Bihac District territory. Since early (?evening) hours, they intensified artillery attacks on Bosanska Otoka and Buzim regions, where civilian districts were simply destroyed by launching hundreds of different projectiles on them. Martic's chetniks also used artillery from UN Protected Areas both on the aforementioned and the Kladusa territories, even trying to provoke infantry clashes along all the front lines in the theater of operations of the 5th Corps. Chetniks are still hurriedly regrouping troops and entrenching themselves better on the Bosanska Krupa section, which clearly indicates that new attacks can be expected there as well. Following yesterday's failures in infantry breakthrough attempts, chetniks somewhat lowered the intensity of their operations on the Grmusko-Srbljanski plateau and the [name indistinct] section of the battlefield."

Nihad Banjanovic reports from the Information Service of the 206th Chivalrous Brigade that "yesterday evening, the Serbo-Montenegrin aggressor started shelling residential districts and defense lines on the free Zvornik territory. Using tanks and 82-mm and 120-mm mortars, chetniks occasionally pounded Sapna, Nezuk, and (Baljkovica), and using antiaircraft machine-guns, Bofors guns, and death-sower machine-guns from Pecina and Parlog they fired on Sapna, Kraljevici, and Zaseok, as well as our defense positions throughout last night. In the morning hours, chetnik artillery became calmer. Fortunately, there have been no casualties and all our defense lines are still firm and stable."

An unnamed correspondent reading a report from the 3d Corps Press Center says that "yesterday, chetnik activities intensified on all battlefields in the 3d Corps theater of operations. Apart from attacking our defense lines, chetniks more and more often resorted to shelling populated places. Yesterday, they shelled Zavidovici from (Blizna), albeit without considerable consequences, while villages along the defense lines were constantly exposed to the aggressor's antiaircraft and artillery weapons. On several occasions, chetnik subversionist-terrorist groups were trying to break through to our positions on the Teslic and Vozuca battlefields. Following precision firing by our fighters, the chetniks have intensified fire from all weapons and have been shelling our positions."

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NATO Air Cover To Extend Into Croatia

AU2209154494 Paris AFP in English 1459 GMT 22 Sep 94

[Excerpts] Brussels, Sept 22 (AFP)—An extension of NATO air cover beyond Bosnia to cover Croatian territory adjacent to the Bihac enclave will come in the next few days, diplomats said here on Thursday.

The move would clear the way for NATO warplanes to react in minutes to a request from UN Protection Force (UNPROFOR) troops in Bihac to strike at Serb forces over the border in Krajina who are increasingly seen as a threat to the French UN forces in the enclave.

UNPROFOR said Thursday that Serb forces had been grouping around the north-east and north-west borders of Bihac over the last few days. The enclave has seen fierce fighting in recent weeks with Bosnian government forces making significant gains against the Serbs. [passage omitted]

Diplomatic sources in Brussels said Thursday the remaining operational obstacles to Alliance planes patrolling the northern part of the region of Krajina that rings two thirds of Bihac should be resolved imminently. [passage omitted]

Parliament Discusses UNPROFOR Extension

LD2209164394 Zagreb Radio Croatia Network in Serbo-Croatian 1500 GMT 22 Sep 94

[Excerpts] The Chamber of Counties, which held a debate on UNPROFOR's [UN Protection Forces] mandate yesterday, has already adopted conclusions on this important issue. In the Chamber of Deputies, which spent the whole morning on topical issues and on establishing the agenda, the debate on UNPROFOR's mandate is to take place after a possible report by Mate Granic, deputy prime minister and foreign minister. Jasenka Dudic and Kreso Zadravec report.

[Dudic] Mate Granic, deputy prime minister and foreign minister, submitted in the Chamber of Deputies the government's report on the current situation and the immediate tasks in the implementation of foreign policy. He commented on the very intensive activities abroad by the president of the state and the Croatian Government, which began in mid-July and are still continuing. The main aim of the top-level Croatian delegation is to make progress in solving the problem of reintegrating the Croatian occupied territories, to conduct the negotiations on UNPROFOR's mandate in the future, and to promote the overall peace process, especially in Bosnia-Herzegovina, Granic said.

At the UN General Assembly, President Tudjman will present Croatian views on the main developments in international relations and appeal on the international community to become involved more resolutely in solving the crisis in this part of Europe in the name and interest of peace. The international community supports our fundamental stances based on law and morality, Granic said. [passage omitted]

[Zadravec] Deputies to the Chamber of Deputies have received conclusions drawn up by a commission of the Chamber of Counties on the basis of a discussion on UNPROFOR's mandate held in the Chamber of Counties yesterday. Among other things, the conclusions advise the Chamber of Deputies and the government to condition the extension of the UN forces' mandate by having a concrete guarantee granted that within certain deadlines UN forces' tasks will be realized, and the peaceful reintegration of temporarily occupied areas in Croatia will be completed.

Further, the international community, including the Contact Group, should be called on to produce a clear and firm peace plan for the liberation, i.e. reintegration of the temporarily-occupied areas in Croatia, which will include the following important components: Mutual and unconditional recognition of all states created in this area from 1991 within their internationally recognized borders; effective supervision of these internationally recognized borders; sanctions against the aggressor's side until a final solution is reached; deadlines for the return of refugees; the constitution and constitutional law on human rights and the fundamental principles of President Tudjman's peace initiative; and clear punitive provisions for states failing to accept such a plan.

If the UN Security Council fails to accept these minimum conditions the Chamber of Counties will put forward a decision on the suspension of UNPROFOR's mandate, the conclusions say, warning in particular of an unacceptable and difficult position in which refugees, the families of those missing and forcefully taken away, have found themselves, and of the brutal violation of their human rights. All responsible international players are called on to urge refugees to return to their homes and dignified life.

Seks Views UNPROFOR Mandate, Europe Policy

AU2309083494 Zagreb VECERNJI LIST in Serbo-Croatian 10 Sep 94 p 13

[Interview with Deputy Prime Minister Vladimir Seks by Mladenka Saric; place and date not given: "My Work for the Government Imposed Restrictions on Me"]

[Text] The political public will say that Deputy Prime Minister Vladimir Seks is one of the most powerful members of the HDZ [Croatian Democratic Community] and the government, whose rating has never been questioned and without whom there can be no crucial developments in Croatia. On the eve of an eventful political autumn, which is to begin with a parliamentary session convened to discuss *the yesterday, today, and tomorrow* of the UNPROFOR [UN Protection Forces] mandate in Croatia—we talked to Vladimir Seks about topical problems on the Croatian political scene.

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[Saric] You have said that this will mark a turning point for Croatia. Why?

[Seks] The UNPROFOR mandate is a result of interests of world forces that did not want to see the war spread outside the territory of former Yugoslavia. UNPROFOR does not have and will never have the mandate to issue threats and use force to implement Security Council resolutions. We must be satisfied that UNPROFOR prevented an all-out war just after it came. However, it is totally inefficient at everything else. UNPROFOR has made it possible for the rebel Serbs to become established in their positions in occupied Croatian areas, enabling increasing integration with Serbia and Yugoslavia; furthermore, UNPROFOR has condoned almost complete ethnic cleansing in those areas. UNPROFOR actions are based on geopolitical presumptions dating from the time when Croatia was not an internationally recognized country. They seem to handle this situation as if this were former Yugoslavia experiencing certain difficulties, with elements of civil war and secession.

Three Croatian Principles

[Saric] A critical mass of frustration has accumulated in Croatia. President Tudjman will speak about aspects of this at the UN General Assembly toward the end of the month. How likely is it that Croatia will manage to redefine the UNPROFOR mandate?

[Seks] It is certain that Croatia will not be in a position to cancel the mandate of the blue helmets. That is one of the principles of our foreign policy. Another principle is that Croatia still wants to see the deployment of international forces of either NATO or the United Nations along its borders. The fact that our diplomatic efforts aim to persuade the main international diplomatic protagonists, especially the United States and Germany, to tie the easing of sanctions against Serbia to the solving of the UNPA [UN Protected Area] zones in Croatia—is a third principle. However, I very much doubt that any of this will happen. U.S. and German diplomacy will most likely yield to strong pressure from French, British, and especially Russian diplomacy, which has openly sided with Serbia and the Bosnian Serbs. Consequently, the sanctions may be eased on the basis of just their signature to the Contact Group plan. Such a resolution has already been prepared.

There is pressure on Croatia from all sides to agree to extending the UNPROFOR mandate.

[Saric] Can we refuse to do that?

[Seks] Not really, although our acceptance entails extending the status quo and the difficult internal turmoil. On the domestic scene, there will be a lot of problems with refugees. All of this leads to the conclusion that this is a crucial moment for Croatia, a turning point: Agreeing to another sterile mandate in Croatia would shatter the political faith in the power of the international community and create the political belief in the possibility of cypriotization of Croatia. On the other hand, to defy the will of the United Nations—and the peace mediators Lord Owen and Stoltenberg, as well as other UN officials, say that this is another option of ours—by rejecting such a mandate is not so simple. They do not make those decisions and are not fully qualified to talk about it. In keeping with the UN Charter, a country can reject peacekeeping forces, but the Security Council can act against its will if it thinks that it would put the entire region in jeopardy. Their statements must not create the opinion that Croatia can say "UNPROFOR go home" and that it will do so. It is dangerous to create the illusion that Croatia can decide any way it wants and that this is an internal matter, as Akashi and others say.

Military Option and Restrictions

[Saric] What is the most likely outcome?

[Seks] I can answer this question from in terms of what will be offered us and what the allies will advise us to do, which is to continue to be patient for a while. We will see what Croatia will decide. This will be one of the most difficult decisions on which the government, the president, parliament, and all the political forces must reach a consensus. Croatian diplomacy is preparing resolutions which are supposed to enable taking practical steps—from opening roads and oil pipelines to returning refugees.... Without concrete action during the UNPROFOR mandate it will all lead to cypriotization.

[Saric] The military option has often been mentioned over the past couple of months. How likely is this?

[Seks] Among some members of UNPROFOR and in some international political circles it is thought that Croatia has no strength for the military option and that it, therefore, must put up with the present situation. They are also trying to convince the Croatian public of this. The military option cannot be discarded altogether, but neither can the global restrictions that such an option entails. We must weigh up all the elements before making our decision—from the military potential of the Serbs in the occupied areas of Croatia, the involvement of Serbia, Montenegro, and the Bosnian Serbs, to the fact that no one would offer any military assistance to Croatia. Just as it was forced to get involved in this war, Croatia can also be forced—owing to the inability to solve its problem through political means and because of the impotence and political discord of the United Nations—to decide to settle the matter by means of weapons. However, we must remember that Croatia cannot count on any military help from abroad and that it could well end up fighting against everyone representing the Serbian political body.

The Opposition Has Also Won

[Saric] Parliament is supposed to pass a resolution on UNPROFOR. The opposition has said that all the previously proposed resolutions carried no weight, for they reflected the HDZ majority, instead of being adopted by

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a consensus, and that, as a rule, they are proposed whenever the president needs them to show that parliament is behind his decisions. Where do you stand on this?

[Seks] Last time, parliament had a discussion without the opposition. And they should have expressed the dissatisfaction of the Croatian nation and shown that political decisions are not solely the result of the will of the president of the country or the prime minister, but that they correspond to the political will of the Croats. However, that very parliament did not want to pass a hard and binding resolution that would be out of step with the possible outcome to the crisis. It would be wrong and counterproductive to dedicate part of a parliamentary session to the year 1991, when Croatia, as a part of Yugoslavia, agreed to the presence of UNPROFOR, and raise the issue of responsibility for the signing of the documents in question.

[Saric] Most opposition parties have announced that they will participate in the next session. Does that constitute a defeat for the opposition and a victory for the HDZ?

[Seks] I do not think that it is either a victory or a defeat, but rather a sign of maturity and responsibility on the part of those who are coming back. It is not true that their comeback represents their capitulation, and neither the HDZ nor the public thinks that.

[Saric] Is it not also a small victory for the HDZ that Stipe Mesic and Josip Manolic are not the vice presidents of the parliamentary chambers after all?

[Seks] I think that this is a great victory for the opposition as well, but some of them are not keen on admitting it in public, because, actually, they were political hostages of Mesic and Manolic. In private, they will admit this and say that they are happy that those two no longer tell them what to do.

"European" and "Anti-European" HDZ

[Saric] HDZ deputies are no longer leaving the party, but there is still talk of internal rifts and factions made up of those for Europe and those against it. You are said to be the advocate of the latter.

[Seks] What you have just said is the product of a thesis about a division into left and right, into radicals and liberals.... The latest hit launched by new democrats is the division into "pro-Europeans" and "anti-Europeans." No analysis has yet been made as to whether anybody really advocates solutions leading toward isolation, which is against Europe and against being part of it. Some are trying to label me as a member of that isolationist faction, but my coordination did not miss a single law corresponding to the relevant European law. [sentence as published] These are political games aimed at discrediting certain people.

[Saric] Regardless of the official denials, some still talk about early elections. Will they happen after all?

[Seks] Early elections could be organized only if the government is defeated in parliament. As long as the president of the republic has a parliamentary majority and is able to name the cabinet, it is not realistic to speak about early elections. There will definitely be no early elections this autumn. Of course, we must never say never, for it is possible to lose the parliamentary majority.

[Saric] Is it true that HDZ hardliners in Croatia are obstructing the realization of the Croat-Muslim Federation and that Alija Izetbegovic is coming to Zagreb to discuss that?

[Seks] I have attended gatherings of HDZ members in Mostar and elsewhere. Susak [Defense Minister] urged all those who were present to get actively involved into the forming of the federation. Indeed, there are some difficulties, for a large number of people are finding it hard to accept the federation, which is a result of the present situation and a consequence of the war. Some Muslim leaders view the federation as the Bosnia-Herzegovina republic and do not see the Croats as having equal rights to Muslims, but rather a minority.

Illusion About Yugoslavia

[Saric] Can you comment on statements that the idea of a confederation between Croatia and the Croat-Muslim Federation will confine Croatia and lay the groundwork for another Yugoslavia, as the Serbs in Bosnia-Herzegovina would form a confederation with Serbia?

[Seks] Some, not very marginal, international political forces maintain that it is still possible to re-establish a country like Yugoslavia. From Croatia's point of view, it is unacceptable that a confederation with the Croat-Bosniak Federation in Bosnia- Herzegovina could form the basis for a future Yugoslavia.

[Saric] Some analysts claim that the scenario of confederation between Croatia and the Bosnia-Herzegovina Federation confirms that no one actually accepts Bosnia-Herzegovina's borders as defined by AVNOJ [Anti-Fascist Council of National Liberation of Yugoslavia].

[Seks] I think there is a lot of hypocrisy involved. From the very beginning, many advocated the division of Bosnia-Herzegovina. These strange and paradoxical ideas—that Bosnia-Herzegovina should remain an integral country, but as a state composed of unions, that the Bosniak-Croat Federation should form a confederation with Croatia, and that the Srpska republic should be connected with Serbia through a form of confederation—are unacceptable and impossible.

[Saric] If Bosnia-Herzegovina, which has received guarantees that its borders would remain unchanged, is a victim of such an underhand game, could that happen to Croatia as well, as it has also been promised integrity?

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[Seks] There is some pressure on Croatia to change its Constitutional Law in order to provide for a kind of political autonomy with the characteristics of a state. Consequently, the opponents of the confederalization and federalization of Croatia are not altogether wrong in their protests, since such political views really do exist. The words of Djukic and Pejnovic [Serbian party leaders in Croatia] are not solely their own. It remains to be seen whether or not we will be forced to change the Constitutional Law.

[Box, p 13]

Discussing the Freedom of the Media

[Saric] You have recently had a discussion with Slobodan Prosperov Novak on the future law on the media.

[Seks] The discussion will continue. The public will also hear from the Croatian Association of Journalists and the Ministry of Culture and Education. One can see on all levels that there is no previously prepared official bill, but just a draft model. The Ministry of Culture has been commissioned to prepare a bill corresponding to European standards. The Government Coordination Committee for Internal Policies has decided to include all interested parties in preparing the bill, particularly journalists, but also representatives of the Council of Europe, and subsequently to have a discussion on the draft version. It did not form the basis of the discussion at the Days of Journalism in Dubrovnik. They talked about the present law on the media and about articles about the responsibility of publishers. The draft version was available only in the corridors and the statement of Prosperov are, therefore, both odd and inappropriate.

[Box, p 13]

Vice President of Parliament Again

[Saric] Will you be coming to this parliamentary session as the vice-president of parliament?

[Seks] I think so.

[Saric] You announced this almost six months ago. Why did you request this position?

[Seks] The Government Coordination Committee for Internal Policies, which I lead, is in charge of discussing bills and coordinating them with other laws and the Constitution. All the basic laws have mostly been passed and so I am no longer needed there. If it had not been for the parliamentary crisis, I would already have been in parliament. As a member of the government, my activities on the political scene are restricted. I would like to get involved in parliamentary discussions and polemics.

[Saric] You said in an interview that you do not approve of the way in which many deputies act in parliament, that they are no match for the opposition. What will you do to change that?

[Seks] This is true. I must take over the party in the Chamber of Representatives, replacing Adam Mestrovic. Parliament should function differently. Deputies must be prepared for discussion; we need good speakers for every discussion to defend the views on behalf of the party, and that is why am I going to parliament.

[Saric] Personnel changes are becoming the focus of interest. There will be a vacancy for the post of HDZ secretary general. Are you a candidate for that function?

[Seks] I am perfectly aware that it is very difficult to be successful in two jobs. I have my hands full with being vice- president of parliament, taking care of internal organization and the functioning of the parliamentary majority. The job of secretary general needs someone to work the whole day.

[Saric] The HDZ already has two parliamentary vice presidents—Mrs. Katarina Fucek and Mr. Zarko Domljan. Does your arrival mean that somebody else will leave?

[Seks] Mrs. Fucek, who is a dear friend of mine, will take over another very important position in Croatia, but she will stay in parliament.

Sarinic Views Negotiations, UNPROFOR

AU2209080094 Zagreb DANAS in Serbo-Croatian 13 Sep 94 pp 13-15

[Interview with Hrvoje Sarinic, head of the Office for National Security, by Milan Jelovac; place and date not given: "Our Minimum Demand Is Reintegration of UNPA's"]

[Text] Hrvoje Sarinic, former head of President's Office, then for a short time prime minister, has for a while been head of the Office for National Security and head of the Croatian delegation in negotiations with the rebel Serbs, but he is also the number one man in charge of relations with UNPROFOR. The expiration of the protection forces mandate, as well as the announcement of a new round of negotiations with Knin were sufficient reason for an interview with Mr. Sarinic.

The first question was the inevitable issue of the continued negotiations with the rebel Serbs, and the unexpected "cooperativeness".

[Sarinic] This is not the first time they have said they supported negotiations, talks, agreements, but when they do sit down at the negotiating table, they set conditions that are absolutely unacceptable to the Republic of Croatia. With the exception of the Zagreb Agreement of 29 March, we have made no special progress in the negotiation process. If the Serb side currently insists on the negotiations being continued, as you have said, especially regarding the opening of the highway, then this initiative should be viewed in a broader context. We should look more toward the east to discover the causes of their formal change of tactics. You are probably well

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aware of the fact that there has been much speculation concerning the conflict between Belgrade and Pale, the question of its credibility. Some have reproached me for naively saying that it was a real conflict rather than just another one of Milosevic's games, but most political analysts agree that this is a real conflict. By isolating Karadzic, Milosevic is probably trying to transfer the guilt, thus granting amnesty to himself, and taking on the role of peacemaker. However, the fact remains that with the change that Belgrade brought about Pale have been isolated. It is therefore not surprising that Karadzic is now looking for allies within, as they say, Serb-hood. The closest at hand is Knin.

[Jelovac] After Milosevic's latest steps, can you see any difference, any change in Martic and Mikelic's firm negotiating platform? How great is Belgrade's influence on them?

[Sarinic] The influence of Belgrade is absolutely the most important aspect, at least it has been so far. It is a public secret that Milosevic appointed Martic, and that Mikelic is Milosevic's pawn. After all, he is a friend of the family, he is very close to Mirjana Markovic. Moreover, it is a known fact that Babic is more radical and that the Serb Orthodox Church is behind him. However, things are evidently changing, and at this moment Belgrade is losing some of its influence on Knin, to Karadzic's benefit. It is indicative that Martic voted at the so-called referendum of the Bosnian Serbs, with which he took a very clear stand toward Belgrade's latest steps. The fact is that Karadzic and his Serbs are now isolated, so they are trying to be a little more cooperative toward the West. They are aware of the vulnerability of their Posavina corridor, and that is the reason they have been taking the initiative to open the Zagreb-Belgrade highway, which they would not hear of just a short while ago.

[Jelovac] You were in Knin on 5 August. Did you discuss the opening of the highway?

[Sarinic] At first they would not hear of it, although eventually they accepted, but from a completely different position. They talked about pensions, water supply, bank accounts, and only at my insistence did they accept the opening of the highway. If they had not agreed to discuss the opening of the highway, I would not have talked to them at all.

You see, it was only afterwards that Milan Babic wrote to Akashi, informing him of the formation of their expert teams to study the entire problem, and announcing that he would inform UNPROFOR of the security and technical aspects of the opening of the highway. Therefore, it is obvious that the Knin change should be viewed in the context of the latest events in Belgrade-Pale relations. We can only speculate on the entire thing, but the important thing is that Croatia from the beginning supported the establishment of communications—however, under certain conditions, which, I assure you, we will insist upon.

[Jelovac] What therefore, is the Croatian negotiating platform; what are the minimums below which the delegation you are heading will not discuss any issues?

[Sarinic] The reintegration of the occupied Croatian territories, the reintegration of the so-called Krajina in the legal and constitutional system of the Republic of Croatia. The mediators in this process are representatives of the international community, peace mediators who go from one side to the other and do everything to coordinate positions in order to reach an acceptable agreement. This is a common instrument in world diplomacy.

[Jelovac] Have the frequent visits of the international mediators to Knin been fruitful—have they resulted in a platform for the normalization process, the opening of the highway?

[Sarinic] They suggested to us the starting platform for the opening of the highway, which was later supposed to be coordinated on both sides. However, I must say that the modalities of these solutions were completely unacceptable to us. They specified four kinds of traffic on the Zagreb-Lipovljani highway. This international plan on the opening of the highway contained provisions to institute traffic between UNPA sector east and sector west. There would be convoy traffic between Nova Gradiska and Lipovac, which is a 110-km long route, and the Croatian police would, according to this suggestion, not be able to stop and control this traffic. The convoys would be escorted by UNPROFOR, which would represent further narrowing of the sovereignty of the Republic of Croatia. We will never agree to that! Moreover, according to this platform, the traffic control on the highway in the UNPA sectors west and east would be conducted by UNPROFOR and the Serb militia. With this they tried to emphasize some sovereignty of some state, which is out of the question. Naturally, the reason this is completely unacceptable is that it does not lead toward our main goal—the beginning of the reintegration of the UNPA's into the constitutional and legal system of the Republic of Croatia.

[Jelovac] Did you present a counterproposal?

[Sarinic] Naturally, we simplified the whole game by saying: "Gentlemen, we concur with UNPROFOR opening the road in the two UNPA sectors, and its position as only controlling authority there. This would therefore relate to the 27 kilometers between Novska and Gradiska, and seven more kilometers from Lipovac to the international border with Serbia, under the condition that the traffic security at the remaining part of the route be guaranteed by the Republic of Croatia by means of the legal system." We therefore provide guarantees to everyone, everyone can take part in the traffic, which will in fact be the real beginning of the implementation of Resolution 871, rather than further philosophizing that does not suit the international community, let alone the Republic of Croatia. The international mediators, cochairmen Owen and Stoltenberg, took this proposal to

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Knin, but there has been no reply so far. It seems that on the other side the awareness that nothing will come out of this self-declared "state" is not present yet. When I was in Knin in August, I told them openly at the very beginning that it was out of the question that we talk and negotiate as representatives of two states regulating some mutual relations.

[Jelovac] What was their reaction to this?

[Sarinic] There was no reaction; they were looking at their papers and were quiet....

I told you what our platform is, what the norms and standards below which we will not agree to go, are. We want to make the whole problem of the highway simpler, because the way the international community has posed it is quite complicated and unacceptable to us. Among other things, they proposed a corridor that would connect the UNPA sectors west and north. Imagine that, they want to round it up!

[Jelovac] The media has said that Mikelic stated on Thursday [8 September] that the priority was to open the highway, and to reestablish the water supply in Zadar in Biograd on the one side, and Novi Licki Osik and Drnis on the other. Will Croatia allow this, considering that the Croat majority was expelled from Drnis a long time ago?

[Sarinic] Yes, but within the framework of general normalization, rather than separately. Their tactics are transparent. They would like to resolve the practical problems—for instance that of the water supply—in the way that neighboring countries do, for instance Italy and Austria. The masks have fallen away, there is no more lying. We know exactly what their present goal is. It is unacceptable to us and we will not negotiate on that basis. However, we strongly believe that they will realize the danger of complete isolation, especially after recent changes and the new relations between Belgrade and Pale. Let us not forget another imminent factor—the probable lifting of the arms embargo and the continuation of the war in Bosnia-Herzegovina, which will undoubtedly reflect on the situation here. This is quite a serious mosaic, and I hope that the Knin analysts and their advisors will analyze the possible development of the situation well, as what we are offering on the basis of the Constitutional Law should be acceptable to them. With the development of the situation, they could get less.

[Jelovac] Mikelic has set the return of Serb refugees to certain parts of western Slavonia and international guarantees for their safety as the condition for the opening of the highway. Can Croatia accept this condition, considering the fact that the Serbs will not allow the return of the Croat refugees, despite the Vance plan and the UN resolutions?

[Sarinic] We demand the return of both Croat and Serb refugees and displaced persons to their homes. This has been the one constant in our politics since the very beginning. It is out of the question to allow the return of only Serb refugees in the name of opening the highway. When the Croats start returning, so will the Serbs.

[Jelovac] Under what conditions will Croatia agree to the extension of the UNPROFOR mandate, considering the increasingly loud discussions in Croatia about Croatia being exposed to international pressure concerning the extension of the mandate? Some are even connecting Mr. Kinkel's recent visit to Zagreb with this issue.

[Sarinic] It would be an exaggeration to say that there is pressure, but the international community is indeed interested in having another mandate and remaining physically present in this area until the solution is found. In less than three weeks the present UNPROFOR mandate will expire, and the president will certainly discuss that when he goes to the United States for a UN General Assembly session. You know that some of the forces have announced they would withdraw their soldiers from UNPROFOR if the arms embargo is lifted. In that case a very delicate situation would arise both in Bosnia-Herzegovina and Croatia. Practically speaking, only the representatives of the Muslim countries would stay, which would only add to the complicated situation in Bosnia-Herzegovina, but also in Croatia, as the solutions to the problems in these two countries are closely connected, the reflections of one situation on the other are constant. In short, we cannot accept this mandate, I assure you. We may accept a mandate that clearly defines the beginning of the process of resolving the problems of integrating the occupied areas, as anything else would be marking time; in other words, cyprization, which we will not allow.

[Jelovac] According to reliable information, UNPROFOR headquarters is busy preparing for the basis of the new plan of the international community concerning Croatia, which would, in form as well as substance, be a copy of the Contact Group plan for Bosnia- Herzegovina. It is supposed to be announced on 15 October, on the 'take it or leave it' principle; in addition to the peace mediators, some representatives from the United States and Russia are also working on it.

[Sarinic] Your news is good. I also heard that something was happening at UN Headquarters, that arrangements were being made and preparations effected, since these partial proposals that we have been discussing, the water supply and the opening of the highway, have turned out to be difficult to achieve. The international community is at a kind of a standstill too, and it is to be expected that it will deal with Croatia's problem in a more radical way. In the long run, this makes us happy, as it has been our negotiating platform from the beginning.

You can simply not make such a difference between the theory of voting the resolutions and the reality on the ground as it exists here in Croatia. I think that the international community will propose more global solutions. We are here, and we are waiting. This is finally all happening at the end of this UNPROFOR mandate,

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which is certainly another factor in the entire problem, as I believe that the international community is at present keen on achieving some result.

Several days ago I talked to Mr. Akashi about a pilot project for the return of the refugees to certain towns. I told him: "Excellency, for God's sake, you must do something!" He agreed, as he is also aware of the situation.

[Jelovac] This is the first time that the international community has tried to arrive at a global solution to the Croatian problem.

[Sarinic] Croatia will accept anything that leads to the opening of the reintegration process. The international community and its mediators understand the problems of Croatia. We have discussed this many times, and it would be very strange if they were to come up with a proposal that conflicts with existing UN Security Council resolutions. If they are working on a global political solution, they cannot avoid reality and the positions of the formal international community and UN Security Council Resolutions 871 and 769.

[Jelovac] You have been head of the Croatian negotiating team for a long time. You went for "secret diplomatic missions in Belgrade" and met with the Serbian President Slobodan Milosevic. What are your impressions of these experiences, considering the fact that a great cross-section of the opposition disapproves of the negotiations with Belgrade?

[Sarinic] There have been public and secret missions, but it is all part of the negotiation process. This is no precedent. We must negotiate, we must exploit all the reserves that lead to a peaceful solution. Naturally, these reserves are exhaustible, and the radical solutions and the war option will not run away. I have talked, and will talk, as long as I am in this position. I have met with President Milosevic many times—with President Tudjman at the negotiations in Karadjordjevo, Tikves, and some other missions. Mr. Milosevic is a cunning politician—I would say that he is a resourceful tactician, but he is not as good a strategist in the long run as he is a good tactician in the short run.

[Jelovac] Newspaper analysts have assessed that the UN Security Council would suspend the sanctions imposed on the FRY [Federal Republic of Yugoslavia], regardless of the Croatian problem, the Serb secession, and the aggression against the Republic of Croatia. Does that not imply the creation of what you have recently called a "smaller Greater Serbia"?

[Sarinic] They will only suspend the sanctions, which will provide a test for the world to put Serbia through to see how serious the sanctions that Belgrade has imposed on Pale are. The possible suspension of sanctions should later develop through the implementation of Resolution 769. However, if the world concludes that this is only a Serbian game, the sanction instruments will be brought back to the present level. This need not have too negative an effect on the further development of the situation, especially if it is only the international community's test. However, the truth is that Croatia has always insisted, and will keep insisting, that the lifting of the sanctions be tied to the problem of the occupied regions of Croatia. This is where almost all the international forces agree, with the exception of some, I would say strange, statements issued lately by Mr. Kozyrev. However, Russians alone cannot convince their partners in the Contact Group that their opinion is the correct one.

[Jelovac] Do you think that a "smaller Greater Serbia" is being created?

[Sarinic] I elaborated on that in a recent interview with VECERNJI LIST, and I have been much attacked for this statement. Everyone is saying that Serbia must not be greater, but smaller than it is. This is what all of us want, for the Serbs never to cross the Drina River. However, they have crossed it. It is difficult not to understand this situation on the ground, and on the other hand there are no sentiments in international politics, as there is no justice. There are interests, there is a balance of powers. Finally, you see that territories are bargained with as if they were an item on the market. The proof of this is the 49:51 ratio. According to what criteria does Serb territory comprise 49 percent, if that is not the case either according to the cadastral situation or the ethnic census? However, the international community agrees that 49 percent is Serb. I was criticized for saying that, but no one was against the 51:49 ratio. Even the Muslims have agreed to it, and Silajdzic said once that the Serbs can leave Bosnia- Herzegovina if they want to, but not with the 49 percent—only with the territories in which they were the absolute majority. Therefore, this is not a case of firm principle, but of bargaining. That is what I had in mind when I said "smaller Greater Serbia".

Naturally, we must do everything to stop this Tatar raid, and when we come to as just a solution as possible, we must make it so that there are no more such raids, with all the guarantees of the international community. As President Tudjman has said himself several times, these raids can lead to a war of civilizations. As soon as a political agreement is reached, the international community will set this border both in the military and political way, so that as little east comes to the west as possible.

[Jelovac] There are rumors that you will soon leave the position of head of the Office for National Security. Mr. Slaven Letica, former advisor to President Tudjman, who many claim has become a fierce critic of Tudjman, has very explicitly talked about that, referring to you.

[Sarinic] With some people changes are the only constant... Yes, Mr. Letica always makes trips into the future. There has been much a lot written on the subject, and my answer is that where there is smoke, there is also fire.

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Mikelic Comments on Inter-Serb Customs Duties

AU2209082994 Belgrade BORBA in Serbo-Croatian 16 Sep 94 p 11

[Report by Srdjan Radulovic on statement by Borislav Mikelic, prime minister of the Krajina Serbs; place and date not given: "The Krajina Government Is Not Blocking the Srpska Republic"]

[Text] "The government of the republic of Serbian Krajina has not made, particularly not on my initiative, any decision by which Krajina takes part in the blockade imposed on the Srpska republic," Borislav Mikelic, prime minister of Krajina, told BORBA, adding that at a meeting on 8 September the government was informed of the new regulation announced by Director of the [Yugoslav] Federal Customs Office Mihalj Kertes, regarding the further work of the customs office in Sremska Raca, and on that occasion a unanimous decision was made on further actions to be taken by the Krajina government.

"That is, in accordance with decisions made at the 187th FRY [Federal Republic of Yugoslavia] Government session, Kertes announced that, from 9 September, motor vehicles carrying goods from the republic of Serbian Krajina can cross the border crossing point at Sremska Raca only if they have an original certificate confirming that the goods originate from that republic, signed by Borislav Mikelic, the republic of Serbian Krajina prime minister. The same applies to goods from the republic of Serbian Krajina that are in transit through any part of FRY territory on their way to some other part of the republic of Serbian Krajina."

I Demanded Modification of Kertes's Instruction

"The aim of the decisions made by the Federal Government and Kertes's instruction to the customs office at Sremska Raca is, according to Mikelic, to monitor goods, rather than to implement or tighten the sanctions against the Srpska republic, because one cannot deny that there have been malpractices whereby the payment of duties or taxes has been evaded by means of false documents, which is also detrimental to the Srpska republic.

"The only problem is that the Federal Government wanted to make me responsible, or rather to make the republic of Serbian Krajina somehow responsible, for any possible non-functioning of the blockade, so that even we have been threatened with a blockade. The Krajina government has only accepted the initiative to establish more order in trade, so in that regard the ministry for trade has been entrusted with this task, also including having Trade Minister Mile Bosnic able to sign documents with my authorization. This was accepted without a formal vote, and Foreign Minister Milan Babic had nothing at all against this. After that, I asked Kertes to modify the instruction to comply with the decisions made by our government," Mikelic said.

Instead, Kertes forwarded another instruction to the customs office in Sremska Raca on 14 September, which even expands the conditions, so that for the transit of goods from Krajina an original certificate is needed, together with a memorandum and the seal of Krajina prime minister Mikelic. The Krajina prime minister says, however, that this does not mean any significant raising of the criteria, and that the Krajina government will insist that the ministry of trade should be authorized in this. Even during our conversation, Mikelic contacted Kertes by telephone and repeated his views, stressing that he would be meeting him later that day. Whether there will be any modification of the instructions is not easy to forecast, while the latest instruction, issued on 14 September, comes into force on Friday, 16 September.

Srpska Republic Makes Transit Difficult

It is interesting, however, that, following this case, Banja Luka's GLAS SRPSKI gave front page treatment to the story, claiming that the strange decision by the republic of Serbian Krajina government may cause serious consequences. A day later, on 12 September, the Srpska republic government introduced a regulation on duties to be levied on goods from Krajina that are in transit through the Srpska republic. Mikelic claims that serious consequences may be brought about precisely by this decision by the Srpska republic government.

Commenting on the view of BORBA's source close to the Krajina leadership regarding the steps taken by the government and Mikelic, particularly that they are unlawful and that the republic of Serbian Krajina is getting involved in the blockade of the Srpska republic, Mikelic said that this was unfounded and untrue, and did not only harm him personally, but also Krajina as a whole.

"These are political games. I responsibly maintain, and this can be checked out in the minutes of the meeting, that no decision was made, that there was no disunity, and that the sole intention of the republic of Serbian Krajina government is to contribute to creating order in the field of trade and the transportation of goods, which can only be of benefit both to Krajina and to the Srpska republic. Also false are claims that Milan Babic has announced his resignation from the government because of alleged disagreements with me. Babic disagrees with any kind of usurpation of authority, because over some important decisions concerning the army or the police, the Krajina government has often been ignored. Everything else is speculation. And if anybody calls my work into question, you can be sure that I shall not wait for the assembly to discuss the issue, but I would rather resign immediately," Mikelic said.

[Box, p 11]

As BORBA has found out from reliable sources, at the meeting held on 8 September the republic of Serbian Krajina government passed a "Decision on Licensed Business Arrangements with the FRY." The decision

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was registered as number 05-3-593/1-94, carrying the seal of the government of the republic of Serbian Krajina and the signature of prime minister Mikelic. It contains eight items: The first states: "All persons and firms in the republic of Serbian Krajina... may buy or sell goods in the FRY only with a license issued by the ministry for trade and tourism." The fifth item states that the relevant licenses are issued by the ministry for trade and tourism with the signature of prime minister Borislav Mikelic, while the eighth item stipulates penalties for any violations, in line with the penalties prescribed by the law on trade.

"This decision," it concludes, "comes into force on the day of its adoption," and it will be announced in the official bulletin of the republic of Serbian Krajina.

Refugees Arrive From Banja Luka Area

AU2209134994 Zagreb HINA in English 1329 GMT 22 Sep 94—FOR OFFICAL USE ONLY

[Text] Zagreb, Sep 22 (Hina)—Forty-five Moslems and Croats expelled from the Banja Luka area, north-western Bosnia, arrived in Croatia last night, UN spokesman in Zagreb, Paul Risley, said today. He added that the number of expelled people sheltered in the transit center in UNPA [UN Protection Area] West came to 543.

Talking about refugees from Velika Kladusa, stranded near Turanj in UNPA North, Risley said they were in a difficult situation and humanitarian organizations would have to provide adequate accommodation if the refugees remained there.

Government Makes Changes in Army Leadership

AU2309072194 Zagreb GLOBUS in Serbo-Croatian 16 Sep 94 pp 51-52

[Report by Srdjan Spanovic: "Major General Stipetic, commander of the Zagreb Regional Corps, Has Been Replaced!"]

[Text] In the wake of the announced personnel changes in the Croatian parliament, the government, leading positions in the information services, the President's Office, and the leadership of the party in power, in the past few months there has been a new wave of changes, appointments, and announcements of retirements in the Croatian Army, the scope of which has certainly been the greatest and most indicative since the intensive war activities ceased.

Far from the eyes of the public, in peace and quiet, as is the case in any military organiztion, the filling in of the personnel crossword started in the Defense Ministry and at Croatian Army Headquarters.

Key changes were made in the top positions of two regional corps, the Zagreb Corps and the Karlovac Corps. The commander of the Zagreb Regional Corps, Major General Petar Stipetic, was in early September replaced by Major General Ivan Basarac, and the chief of staff of the Zagreb Regional Corps is now Brigadier Damir Gorseta instead of Colonel Vinko Stefanek. The former commander of the Karlovac Regional Corps, Major General Pavao Miljevac, has been replaced by Major General Miljenko Crnjac. For the time being there are no announcements of changes in other regional corps, for instance the Osijek Corps (whose commander is Major General Djuro Decak) or the Split Corps (commanded by Major General Ante Gotovina), but this does not mean that there will not be any.

The former commander of the Zagreb Regional Corps, the largest and in almost every respect the most important corps in Croatia, Major General Petar Stipetic, is a highly educated officer, who moved to the Croatian Army from the JNA [Yugoslav Peoples' Army], where he had graduated from the top military schools. His last important duties in the Yugoslav army were those as head of the Operational Department of the Command of the 5th Military District, and commander of the Defense Command Office for Zagreb. After he placed himself at the disposal of Croatia in 1991, he was appointed deputy chief of staff of the Croatian Army under General Antun Tus.

The public remembers Stipetic primarily as a participant in many negotiations with the rebel Serbs, in which, the well-informed claim, he played an important role and often served as a corrective to the politicians, a person who, in a militarily relentless way, but always realistically, assessed Croatia's military potentials and did not overestimate the enemy's strength.

At present, this man, who started his military career in the Croatian Army at near the top, is probably facing forced retirement. Namely, Major General Stipetic has no formal schedule—not because there is lack of high military duties he could perform, but primarily because of a political decision. We have learned from reliable sources that the replacement of General Stipetic was preceded by a conversation with President Tudjman, and that he discussed a possible new duty with the president after he had passed his duties on to General Basarac. Among other duties, Stipetic was offered Brigadier Miroslav Jezrecic's position of commander of the Croatian Military Education Center Petar Zrinski. The offer was allegedly explained by the claim that the intention was to add importance to the Croatian Military Education Center and raise the level of expert military knowledge passed on to Croatian officers during training. If General Stipetic had accepted this position, it is likely that very few people would have noticed his replacement, but he refused to be pushed aside.

The essence of replacing General Stipetic probably lies in the fact that is unknown to the public: He was among those rare senior officers in important command positions—he was first at headquarters, and then in the Zagreb Regional Corps—who at all times openly opposed the conflict between the Croats and Muslims in Bosnia-Herzegovina. He has always stood by this

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opinion; he explained it from the military and political aspects during many meetings at headquarters and also at meetings between the top military structures of Croatia and President Tudjman.

Exemplary Names

Major General Ivan Basarac, who has taken over Stipetic's position, is also an officer who started his military career as a trained officer in the Yugoslav army. Born in Karlovac, he held the position of head of the Ground Troops Corps at Croatian Army Headquarters, and, according to the information available, he is one of the officers who, apart from clearly expressing their Croatian orientation, say very little about their political views. He could, therefore, hardly be said to be part of any political group, but it can certainly be said that he is connected to General Janko Bobetko, the present chief of staff, through mutual trust and the respect of each other's military expertise.

In the Croatian Army General Basarac was, at the beginning of the homeland war, commander of the 1st Armored-Mechanized Varazdin Brigade, following the fall of the army barracks in Zagorje, and later, during the fighting on the Slavonia fronts, he was commander of the 3d Guards Brigade.

His closest associate at the new position will be Brigadier Damir Gorseta, who was commander of the 153rd Velika Gorica Brigade during the war, and then head of the office of the chief of staff, General Bobetko. Damir Gorseta is one of the best educated Croatian officers, and speaks several languages.

The mere fact that he was head of General Bobetko's office speaks of the confidence the chief of staff has in him. It could be said that he belongs to the group of high-ranking officers who are not exposed politically and in public, and who should serve as models in the organization of the army, the criteria of which will be professional knowledge, patriotism, and clear orientation toward the defense and strengthening of the Croatian state rather than a certain political party.

As brigade commander, Gorseta was wounded. Before the war, he had worked at Territorial Defense Headquarters in Velika Gorica, and was one of the first organizers of defense and the establishment of the Croatian Army. He graduated as one of the best students at the Department of National Defense of the Faculty of Political Science in Zagreb. Intrestingly, Brigadier Gorseta is of the same generation as Major General Miljenko Crnjac and Brigadier Darko Grdic [head of the Ground Troops Corps], who have also recently taken up new positions.

Crnjac Is Susak's Man

Major General Miljenko Crnjac was, until recently, deputy minister of defense and head of personnel. Many have accused him of being one of those most responsible for the rank inflation in the Croatian Army, for promotions to high ranks of people who had no appropriate military or expert knowledge, but were members of the appropriate political party and were politically suitable.

During the war Crnjac was commander of the 123rd Pozega Brigade. His command has been linked to the still unclear operation in western Slavonia in late 1991, when his and the 127th Brigade under the command of Djuro Decak, failed to carry out their tasks fully—allegedly owing to poor coordination, indecision, reorganization, hesitation, and a failure to understand the plan. General Decak denied these accusations at the time, demanding that the entire case be carefully analyzed, and that judgment and decisions be made on the basis of analysis, not permitting that either he or Crnjac be judged "in a hurry."

Those who are well-informed claim that Crnjac's appointment as commander of the Karlovac Regional Corps was a compromise. Namely, he is a person in whom Defense Minister Gojko Susak has much confidence, which means that they probably share political opinions. Moreover, his former job was at the Ministry of Defense, and it was primarily a political one.

Major General Pavao Miljevac, Crnjac's predecessor as head of the Karlovac Regional Corps, is taking up the position of deputy head of the Home Guards Units at Croatian Army Headquarters. A person suitable for this position was being sought for a long time after General Zvonimir Cervenko left to take up the position of head of the president's Military Office.

General Miljevac was commander of the Karlovac Regional Corps for two years—from September 1992—and the public remembers him as the negotiator with the rebel Serbs of Kordun. Prior to this, Miljevac was commander of the 137th Duga Resa Brigade.

Brigadier Darko Grdic, the new head of the Ground Troops Corps at headquarters, has cooperated with General Cervenko a lot since the independent Croatian state was established. Grdic is one of the people who made a great contribution to the first stage of the defense of Croatia, having organized unarmed National Defense units, and later 14 Zagreb brigades and many independent units in the Zagreb area, which took part in the defense of Croatia on all the frontlines. When General Cervenko was appointed secretary of national defense for Zagreb, Darko Grdic was the number one man of the Territorial Defense of Zagreb.

After he was appointed to this new, extremely responsible position, he was reproached for his lack of combat experience at the fronts, in commanding combat units. This can hardly be compensated for by a university degree in national defense, or an education at the Croatian Military Education Center Petar Zrinski, where, as one of the best students in his generation, he won the book "Glory and Martyrdom" as a prize.

Having graduated from Petar Zrinski, Major General Marijan Marekovic, who emerged during the war, was

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also appointed to headquarters. Marekovic was born in 1959 in Sesvetski Kraljevac, and, along with Miljenko Crnjac, he is the youngest Croatian general. He graduated from the police high school in Zagreb, and until war broke out he had worked at the Ministry of the Interior in Jastrebarsko. With the establishment of the new authorities in 1990, he became commander of a special police company in Rakitje; in mid-May 1991 he was appointed deputy commander of the 1st National Guards Brigade, and on the last day of 1991 he became commander of the legendary 1st Guards Brigade, the Tigers.

Major General Vinko Vrbanac has also been appointed to headquarters, and, along with Marekovic, Ante Gotovina, Josip Lucic, Mladen Markac, Nojko Marinovic, and Ivan Jelic, he is claimed to be part of the group of Croatian war generals who earned their rank on the frontlines. During the war Vrbanac was General Karlo Gorinsek's deputy when he was commander of what is now the Osijek Regional Corps. During the defense of Vukovar, he was appointed deputy to Mile Dedakovic-Jastreb in Vinkovci. Vrbanac is a trained officer who was lieutenant-colonel in the Air Force before he left the JNA and joined the Croatian Army. After Dedakovic was arrested, Vrbanac was for a while commander of the Vukovar-Vinkovci-Zupanja Operational Group. Those who cooperated with him say that he is a great military expert, a calm and cautious person, who fits well into any professional military team.

The Marginalization of Headquarters

The current personnel changes are, according to well-informed sources, supposed to keep up with other changes and promotions, as well as retirements. One who could soon retire, primarily because of his age, is Brigadier Ivan Plasaj, who, along with Brigadier Marijan Jezrecic (both were JNA colonels before the aggression against Croatia), was someone most responsible for the success of the operation to liberate western Slavonia in autumn 1991, as at the time these two were commander and chief of staff of the Bjelovar theater of operations. Brigadier Jezrecic is supposed to be retiring as commander of the Croatian Military Education Center Petar Zrinski, as is Major General Franjo Feldi, who, since headquarters was established, has been carrying out the delicate duty of head of headquarters' Operational Department.

Minister Susak's political supporters have interpreted the latest changes in the army as regular and necessary changes, through which the Croatian Army is being reorganized to keep up with contemporary world trends and to meet the demands necessary for Croatia to join Partnership for Peace, that is, to knock on the door of NATO. They say that the people appointed are trained officers, most of them young and highly educated, who have demonstrated their abilities in the war, having grown from fighters into soldiers and officers, while those who came from the JNA as military experts are not being discriminated against. Moreover, they say that the army is being depoliticized; of those who are loyal to the state and are not members of the ruling party the most important are being promoted. The names mentioned in this context are those of Damir Gorseta, Vinko Vrbanac, and Marijan Marekovic.

Those Croatian Army officers who do not fully approve of the latest changes claim that the replacement of General Stipetic is the start of deeper personnel changes in the army, which should eventually end in the retirement of Army General Janko Bobetko, the chief of staff, and indisputably one of the greatest military experts in Croatia. There is an apolitical argument in favor of Bobetko's retirement: his age and health (he was born in 1919).

With his retirement headquarters would be marginalized, and other military organizations would be at the center of attention—primarily the the 1st Croatian Guards Corps under the command of Major General Mile Cuk, and under the immediate authority of Defense Minister Gojko Susak.

Serbs Postpone Exercises in Sector South

AU2209131994 Zagreb HINA in English 1236 GMT 12 Sep 94—FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

[Text] Zagreb, Sep 22 (Hina)—Military authorities of Croatia's rebel Serbs postponed military exercises, planned to be done in UN Protection Area [UNPA] Sector South, a UN spokesman, Paul Risley, said today in Zagreb.

"The Serbs in UNPA announced the military exercises two days ago demanding a great number of tanks and other kinds of heavy weapons to take from the UN-monitored weapons depot," Risley told journalists.

They postponed the military exercises after yesterday's protest of UNPROFOR [UN Protection Forces], the UN spokesman said.

Serb rebels took two devices for clearing mines from a UN-monitored arms depot in UNPA Sector North at the beginning of the week. Risley said UNPROFOR was pressing the Serb side for returning them to the ammunition storage.

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Peterle Presents Foreign Policy Document

AU2209172894 Ljubljana DELO in Slovene 16 Sep 94 p 1

[Report by Romana Dobnikar-Seruga: "Strategy of our Links With the World"]

[Text] Ljubljana, 15 Sep—Having been drafted by the Foreign Ministry for a year and half in coordination with all the other ministries, critically discussed by the political parties, and debated by government committees, the document on Slovene foreign policy strategy has come close to its final form. At a session held today, Foreign Minister Lojze Peterle presented it to government members who are to discuss it—together with relations with Italy—on 19 September, and then the document will be presented for discussion in the State Chamber.

Speaking at a news conference after the government session, Peterle first reiterated his well-known thesis about the need to demystify this document, which many countries (including the United States and China) do not have at all, and pointed out that it is a document of a strategic nature, which denotes the origins, aims, and priorities of Slovene foreign policy, but has nothing to do with day-to-day politics. The document first analyses the international situation and establishes Slovenia's position in the international community in view of its relatively small size but strategically significant position, and establishes basic values (peace, security, welfare, democracy, protection of human rights and minorities, etc.) and aims (good relations with neighbors, joining European integration processes, the strengthening of a Central European identity, and advancing the Slovene spirit into the world).

The document also includes foreign policy guidelines, not only in the narrow sense of the word, but also in the area of national security, the economy, culture, science, and sports. A special chapter is devoted to Slovenes in the world (minorities, workers abroad, and emigrants). As regards connections with the European integration processes, the document sets up as an aim membership of the European Community (the document uses the Slovene word for community to translate union) on an equal footing and NATO, but there is no mention of the European Free Trade Association or the Visegrad Group. This document, over 30 pages long, also includes chapters about relations with neighbors, cooperation with countries outside Europe, and international organizations.

Speaking at the news conference, Minister Peterle rejected remarks about the time that it had taken to draft the foreign policy strategy document and said that both the government and himself were presenting basic strategic foreign policy guidelines to the Committee for Foreign Policy Relations.

Equal Status for Slovenes in Italy Sought

BR2009145594 Rome LA REPUBBLICA in Italian 20 Sep 94 p 13

[Unattributed report: "Slovene Government Says No to Italy"]

[Text] Ljubljana—Regarding its relations with Italy, Slovenia has rejected the requests put forward by the government in Rome, and is asking for the same status for the Slovene community in Italy as for Italians in Slovenia. This was decided yesterday by the government in Ljubljana.

Janez Drvnovsek's government approved a draft joint statement on relations between the two countries, which Slovenia will submit to Italy in response to the statement addressed by Italian Foreign Under Secretary Livio Caputo to his Slovene counterpart Ignac Golov during a recent meeting in Rome.

In fact, Slovenia does not accept Caputo's draft. In particular, Ljubljana is demanding "a tutelary framework law, and the maintenance of the present level of funding for its institutions." As regards real estate property, the Slovene Government has rejected Italy's request to allow exiles to recover the homes which they were forced to abandon. The Slovene Government confirmed, too, that the Osimo Treaty and the Rome memorandum remain the basic documents for further relations with Italy.

Article Examines Foreign Minister's Resignation

AU2209145694 Ljubljana DELO in Slovene 17 Sep 94 p 2

[Vladimir Vodusek, Marko Pecauer article: "The Background of a Personal Decision"]

[Text] Ljubljana, 16 Sep—Last night, Lojze Peterle, head of the Christian Democrats, announced measures by the SKD [Slovene Christian Democratic Party] in the event Jozef Skolc is elected chairman of the State Chamber, but Peterle's resignation is nevertheless surprising. Next week, the SKD will hold meetings of its executive committee and its council to decide whether the party remains in the coalition at all. Peterle said that the tripartite coalition's fate is in the hands of Liberal Democracy and he himself had decided to take that weekend off.

The reasons for his resignation should also be sought in the background of events in the parliament. Thus, Zmago Jelincic's statement that the SNS [Slovene National Party] had voted for Skolc as promised and that a vote of no confidence in the foreign minister would be held in some 30 days time was particularly significant. Among the reasons for Peterle's resignation, one should also mention reactions by SKD members to Skolc's candidacy. Besides, the decision was probably also affected by talks held with prominent Church dignitaries.

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Herman Rigelnik's departure caused the tripartite coalition of Liberal Democrats, Christian Democrats, and the United List to end. Negotiations between the LDS [Liberal Democracy of Slovenia] and the SKD about a biparty coalition will probably be held in the coming days and in the event they fail, the SKD would go into opposition. In the wake of today's events, what is certainly left is the major question of what will happen with the top LDS leadership in the coming days.

"We have a new State Chamber chairman, and I have presented the possibility of a new foreign minister as well," Lojze Peterle said at the beginning of his news conference today at which he explained his resignation as foreign minister and deputy prime minister. He pointed out in particular that his resignation was irrevocable. "What is involved is a principled reply to unprincipled conditions."

According to him, it is a personal decision, though all members of the party's coordination committee agreed with it. the main reason he cited for his resignation was the way the LDS had carried out the election of the new chairman of the State Chamber. Such a way seemed to Peterle to be improper, dishonest, and coercive; the LDS had behaved as if it was a matter concerning a single party rather than the parliament.

People in the SKD are against a monopoly on power, Peterle said. That is why they reacted when the LDS took over leadership of the State Council and opposed the fact that the LDS now put forward its member as candidate for State Chamber chairman. Herman Rigelnik at least was not formally an LDS member. The SKD does not want to take part in political projects that would encourage political bipolarity, and therefore did not sign the Slovene Spring agreement and did not concur to coercion by the LDS.

Peterle mentioned in passing that it is difficult to talks to the LDS as its chairman is chairman only because of the post he holds and is not the party leader. Peterle also spoke about the talks held today with the ZLSD [United List of Social Democrats] at Minister [Rado] Bohinc's initiative. At the meeting, Peterle, as he put it, pointed out in particular that decisionmaking under pressure is harmful, that 50 years after the end of World War II one should not broach false fronts, and that if the ZLSD would essentially change its position on past guilt, the property of sociopolitical organizations, and lessons on religion, the SKD would be prepared to accept that the ZLSD should remain part of the coalition.

Defense Minister Denies Special Brigade Purge

AU2109170794 Ljubljana Radio Slovenia Network in Slovene 1330 GMT 21 Sep 94

[Robert Skerjanc report on news conference by Defense Minister Jelko Kacin in Ljubljana on 21 September]

[Text] Journalists were above all interested in the cadre changes in the 1st Special Brigade Moris and the weapons trade affair. As far as the former issue: the cadre replacements in the 1st Special Brigade Moris are concerned, Minister Kacin said that no purges of any kind are involved, and that all the officers replaced are still employees of the Defense Ministry. Such a decision was made on the basis of a brigade inspection, since it was established that the brigade does not meet expectations, as well as on the basis of the new role Slovenia plays in international relations, which involves an obligation to take part in the collective security system and the Partnership for Peace program. Therefore, such a special brigade that is very soon going to take part in peace missions and joint military exercises needs officers who would find it easy to communicate and issue orders to the army in a foreign language, Minister Kacin said.

As to the other topic, the weapons trade affair, Kacin said that upon assuming the ministerial post, Jansa [former defense minister] presented him with a report on this issue, which later turned out to be incomplete and missing some deals that were still taking place on our territory. This is why, on 22 August, Minister Kacin sent Jansa a letter asking him to complete the report. In his letter, Jansa failed to reply to the question, but asks a new one that did not directly concern the Defense Ministry and the issue of the reported weapons trade at Brnik airport. This is what yesterday's and today's newspapers are writing about.

On 29 August, Minister Kacin sent a new letter to which he still has not received an answer. The Defense Ministry opened an investigation and informed the prime minister and the political collegium about the findings so far. In connection with all that, Minister Kacin pointed out that weapons and the weapons trade have a strategic significance for Slovenia, particularly since the weapons embargo still applies to us. This is why it seems inappropriate to him that, due to political interests, some people present Slovenia as an unstable country abroad and to potential exporters.

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Federal

Army Magazine: U.S. Stalling Bosnia Solution

LD2309152494 Belgrade TANJUG in English 1455 GMT 23 Sep 94

[Text] Belgrade, Sept. 23 (TANJUG)—The Yugoslav Army magazine VOJSKA wrote Thursday that Washington is in no hurry to help resolve the Bosnia crisis because of its own strategic interests in the Balkans.

Using its influence with the international "Contact Group" for Bosnia-Herzegovina, the United Nations, NATO and the European Union, the current United States Administration is actually stoking the fire of the Bosnian war, said VOJSKA.

The U.S. threat to unilaterally exempt the Bosnian Muslims from the U.N. arms embargo for all of former Yugoslavia if the proposal is rejected by the Security Council shows that Washington has never really favored a negotiated settlement for Bosnia, the magazine said.

Secret arms deals with Islamic and other countries may be behind the U.S. Bosnia policy, but it is primarily motivated by the U.S. strategic, military and economic interests in the Balkans, for which Bosnia is just a stepping stone, said VOJSKA.

VOJSKA said that the geostrategic position of Bosnia and, for that matter, of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) appeared to be of utmost importance to the United States because of its vital interests in the Middle East.

These interests have largely been translated into the new strategy of NATO in which the United States plays a dominant role, said VOJSKA.

Governent Adopts Platform for UN Assembly

LD2209153294 Belgrade TANJUG in English 1427 GMT 22 Sep 94

["Pool" item]

[Text] Belgrade, Sept. 22 (TANJUG)—The Yugoslav Government adopted Thursday a platform for its delegation to the United Nations General Assembly session.

The delegation will be in New York from September 26 until October 10. Federal Foreign Minister Vladislav Jovanovic will head the delegation.

There are 160 items on the agenda of the Assembly session, including a report by the War Crimes Tribunal for Former Yugoslavia. The agenda will also include debates on the many crisis spots in former Yugoslavia, especially those in civil war-torn Bosnia-Herzegovina.

The situation in the "occupied territories" in Croatia will also be discussed. The agenda description "occupied territories" implies the republic of Serb Krajina, formed by Serbs in 1991 in answer to the forcible secession of Croatia from the former Yugoslav federation and the elimination of Serb national rights from its new constitution.

A government statement said the Yugoslav Government session, which was chaired by Prime Minister Radoje Kontic, also adopted several platforms for Yugoslav representatives and delegations to forthcoming international meetings. The many activities will include the participation of a Yugoslav delegation in the European conference on railways and the European traffic policy in Berlin in early October.

Lilic Outlines 'Peace' Stance to Japanese Guests

LD2209201894 Belgrade TANJUG in English 1922 GMT 22 Sep 94

["Pool" item]

[Text] Belgrade, Sept. 22 (TANJUG)—Yugoslav President Zoran Lilic said Thursday that Yugoslav leaders would remain true to their policy of peace in the interest of all Serbs and 11,000,000 Yugoslav citizens. In the talks with a Japanese parliamentary delegation, Lilic said he was confident the delegates could have seen for themselves during their several-day visit that Yugoslavia followed a constructive and peaceful policy and that Serbs were not aggressors.

The multi-party delegation of Japanese MPs [members of parliament] is headed by Takashi Kosugi, chairman of the Japanese Parliament Lower House Budgetary Committee and vice chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee.

Lilic also said all Yugoslav citizens had equal rights regardless of their ethnic origin or religion. The proof for this is the fact that the about 500,000 refugees in Yugoslavia include about 70,000 Muslims or Croats, while about 70,000 Muslims have fled to the republic of Serb Krajina before the Sarajevo government Muslim army, he said.

A statement issued by the president's office quoted Lilic as saying Yugoslavia's "major goal is to cooperate in peace with all countries in the world and to improve relations with a large number of countries." Saying that these relations had deteriorated because of the current crisis, he said they should be improved quickly and 'on principles of mutual interest,' the statement said.

Both sides agreed that the international community had made a serious mistake in supporting the secessionist former Yugoslav republics by recognizing them as independent states. They also agreed that the consequences of such a move could be most drastically felt in Bosnia-Herzegovina.

The international community should therefore take major responsibility for finding a just resolution of the

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problem by showing equal regard for the interests of all warring sides, and, in particular, for ending the war, the statement said.

Yugoslavia backed the "Contact Group" plan for Bosnia not because it is ideal but because it can help restore peace or help towards a continuation of the peace talks, Lilic said.

Yugoslav leaders decided with a heavy heart to do what they had to do as regards the Bosnian Serbs, Lilic was quoted as saying. The Yugoslav Government broke off all political and economic relations with the Bosnian Serb republic on August 4, closing the common border for all but relief aid deliveries.

The decision was prompted by the Bosnian Serb national assembly's rejection of Belgrade's appeals to accept the contact group plan for the territorial division of Bosnia-Herzegovina. Lilic said Yugoslavia would continue to send relief aid deliveries to the Bosnian Serbs, saying that 7,000 tons of food supplies and other consumer goods had been sent to them over the past month. "Choosing between a continuation of war or peace, we have chosen peace. Nothing can justify more casualties and further destruction," he said.

Lilic thanked the Japanese MPs on the extremely correct position of their country, government and media in resolving the crisis in the former Yugoslavia.

The Japanese MPs said they were embittered by the fact that neither international mass-media nor the United Nations had paid proper attention to the objective situation in the region. They were also embittered by the fact that the sanctions against the Yugoslav Federation of Serbia and Montenegro had affected the already most sensitive social groups.

Therefore, their task when they return to Japan will be to inform the government and the foreign affairs minister about their views, and to make proposals on how to improve the situation in Yugoslavia and help restore peace. They will primarily make proposals on measures to help along the lifting of the sanctions against Yugoslavia and will see to it that Japanese media report about the first-hand knowledge they obtained during their visit, the mps said.

Commenting on Japan's offer to help Yugoslavia's economic recovery, Lilic said the economic recovery was Yugoslavia's top priority and all Japan's steps to this effect would be welcome.

Serbia

Parties on Croatia's Territorial 'Pretensions'

LD2209201094 Belgrade TANJUG in English 1820 GMT 22 Sep 94

[Text] Belgrade, Sept. 22 (TANJUG)—Serbian parties on Thursday commented Croatia's latest pretensions on Serbia's territorial waters close to the Adriatic peninsula of Prevlaka.

The New Democracy Party said the newest Croatian aspirations were "a propaganda decision." New Democracy Vice President Cedomir Mirkovic said that Zagreb's decision to redraw the border at the entrance of the Boka Kotorska Bay, in Montenegro, was calculated to cause a propaganda effect.

Opposition Democratic Party of Serbia spokesman Milorad Jovanovic said that this was "a major provocation by the Zagreb regime." Jovanovic said that the provocation comes at a time when "it is certain that international pressures would aim to recognize Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina within the administrative borders of the former Yugoslavia."

Opposition Radical Party leader Vojoslav Seselj said Croatia's decision was expected. Seselj said Prevlaka was currently only formally controlled by the United Nations because Croat police freely arrest and harrass Yugoslav citizen there. He said Prevlaka could only be recaptured through military action.

Opposition Serbian Renewal Movement official Bogoljub Pejcic said his party had not taken part either in taking or in handing over Prevlaka and that "the responsible gentlemen should now explain why they did this and on whose behalf."

Montenegrin Foreign Minister Miodrag Lekic said Thursday it was irresponsible to prejudge the Prevlaka issue and that this could disrupt stability. Lekic said this was harming the search for a peaceful and just solution to a very important question.

The chairman of Croatia's Commission for Borders, Hrvoje Kacic, said in Zagreb Tuesday that Croatia had redrawn the borders of its territorial waters towards Montenegro to expand them for 252 square km. Croatia decided to reach into the Boka Kotorska Bay which belongs to Montenegro.

After the August 1992 London conference the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia agreed to a compromise and temporary solution for Prevlaka which included U.N. troops stationed there.

New Ammunition Plant Ready To Begin Production

AU2209125194 Belgrade VECERNJE NOVOSTI in Serbo-Croatian 19 Sep 94 p 3

[Report by "R.M.": "There Will Be Enough Cartridges"]

[Text] Everything is ready for the start of the production of ammunition for hunting weapons in the first privately owned factory for hunting ammunition. The firm belongs to the Alpen company, owned by Slavisa Mrdakovic-Mrdak, a lawyer from Kragujevac.

The first privately owned firm to produce hunting weapon ammunition has obtained approval from the relevant state organs and its cartridges meet the required standards. As we have learned unofficially, Alpen has

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already signed a contract to sell 15 million rounds of hunting ammunition to Italy and Germany, on the condition that the goods are delivered as soon as sanctions are lifted.

Alpen is expected to supply the domestic market—which is very "hungry" for hunting ammunition since the production in Trepca in Srbica has almost come to a halt and since Krusik of Valjevo is the only domestic supplier—with some 16 million rounds of 12- and 16-gauge ammunition bearing the Alpen trademark.

Kosovo

Serbian Police Continue Raids in Ferizaj

AU2209185794 Tirana TVSH Television Network in Albanian 1635 GMT 22 Sep 94

[Text] The Serbian police continue their violence all over Kosova. Meanwhile, Serbs have warned of new trials against Albanians. Mehmet Haziri is on the line:

[Haziri] In defiance of numerous reactions by international institutions such as Amnesty International, Helsinki Watch, etc. condemning Serbian violence in Kosova, the Serbian police and their henchmen continue to carry out violence against Albanians and their institutions. Albanian educational, party, and other activist associations in Kosova are targets of the occupying authorities.

The Kosova Information Center reports of police raids in all Ferizaj high schools. Serbian security inspectors questioned Ahmet Gajtani and Bahri Ahmeti, principals of Faik Konica and Tefik Canga High Schools, as well as Nazmi Krasniqi, principal of Gjon Serreqi Elementary School. The Serbian inspectors exhibited interest in teaching practices and the private buildings where high school students attend classes. Rustem Sefedini, member of the Kosova Democratic Alliance [LDK] Presidency branch for Ferizaj and the commune's head of education, was interrogated.

Reports from the field confirm raids and mistreatment in the communes of Podujeve, Vushtrri, Prizren, Kamenice, and Skenderaj.

The Kosova Information Center reports that Serbs installed in the Regional Court in Mitrovice will start another trumped-up trial tomorrow against Avdi Dahrami, Ismet Veliqi, and Ilaz Gashi from Skenderaj, and Milaim Berisha from Gllogovc. These activists were arrested six months ago under the pretext of allegedly forming a defense militia in this commune of Drenice.

Rugova Calls for Organized Political Action

AU2109130994 Tirana TVSH Television Network in Albanian 1800 GMT 19 Sep 94

[Text] The meeting of the Kosova Democratic Alliance [LDK] General Council has ended in Prishtina after a five-hour debate. The meeting, presided over by President Rugova, decided to expand the membership of the LDK presidency and elected two deputy chairmen and a secretary general. Correspondent Qani Mehmeti is on the line from Prishtina:

[Mehmeti] A public statement just issued by the Kosova Information Center says that at the beginning of the meeting, Chairman Ibrahim Rugova called for prudent and organized political action in view of the situation and repression in Kosova. The LDK and the Albanian political parties, as well as other state institutions in Kosova, have a democratic orientation and are recognized as such by the international community, President Rugova said.

He objected to the various ideological labels that some people were attempting to pin on the LDK in an attempt to discredit it and the other parties in Kosova. The Serbian media and their regime use these ideological labels to weaken our freedom and independence movement, Dr. Rugova stressed. Unfortunately, the same is being done by some of the Albanian media and naive individuals who think ideologically and are seeking to open an internal, ideological battle line between the Albanians of Kosova, Rugova added. Rugova focused on the fact that the LDK is a large party that has pursued a democratic policy for the past five years and has organized people with various viewpoints but with a democratic orientation. Rugova appealed to the LDK General Council to show prudence, maturity, tolerance, and political awareness. He said that the logic of eliminating political activists should be avoided in Kosova.

Toward the end of his speech, Dr. Rugova said that the general council and its presidency should accomplish the tasks put forward at their last meeting and warned that, in its work, the council should respect democratic mechanisms.

Dr. Rugova further opened a discussion about the resignations of Dr. Fehmi Agani and Edita Tahiri from the party presidency. In the debate, which lasted more than five hours, the LDK General Council members discussed the situation in Kosova and considered the reasons for the resignations. They called on Dr. Agani and Miss Tahiri to withdraw their resignations. During the meeting, Dr. Engjell Berisha submitted his irrevocable resignation from the LDK Presidency for personal reasons, and this resignation was accepted. The LDK General Council refused to accept the resignations submitted by Dr. Fehmi Agani and Edita Tahiri and decided to expand the presidency's membership to include Dr. Rexhep Gjergji, Skender Blaka, and Naim Zeka. The council also elected Dr. Fehmi Agani and Idajet Hyseni as deputy chairmen. Fatmir Sejdiu was elected secretary general of the party.

As already reported, Ibrahim Rugova was reelected LDK chairman by the assembly of this party.

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Rugova Cited on 'Reprisals,' 'Repression'

AU2209080194 Tirana RILINDJA in Albanian 18 Sep 94 pp 1,3

[Report by Ymer Avdiu on news conference given by Kosova Democratic Alliance leader Ibrahim Rugova in Prishtina on 16 September: "The Kosova Democratic Alliance Is a Civil Party of the Center"]

[Text] After the incident last week in which Violeta Dervishaj was killed in Decan, repression has continued with the arrest of three people. Meanwhile, 46 persons were arrested in Isnig during a cultural event marking the anniversary of the Constitution of the Republic of Kosova. Many of them were beaten, while Mere Zekaj from Raushig near Peje is in a serious condition from his wounds. These incidents have increased tension in the Decan region, Ibrahim Rugova, president of the Republic of Kosova, said at the start of today's news conference.

Reprisals Cover Up Murders

Systematic repression and raids under the pretext of searching for weapons have continued in the [word indistinct] of Podujeve, [word indistinct], Malisheve, Prishtina, Obilig, Vushtrri [Vucitrn], Viti, Junik, Ferizaj [Urosevac], Mitrovice, Gjakove, Skenderaj [Srbica], etc.

Violence against political activists continued during the week. Officials of Democratic Alliance of Kosova [LDK] branches and sub-branches were arrested in Decan, Prishtina, and Peje, while Muharrem Avdiu, member of the Presidium of the LDK Podujeve branch, has also been arrested.

Repression is continuing in the villages of Nekoc and Kazhnareke near Gllogoc, Rugova said, under the pretext that a forest ranger has been killed under unexplained circumstances. Evictions from apartments have continued, as in the case of [words indistinct] in Prishtina, and in Lipjan call-up papers have been sent to Albanian former military officers.

A new political show trial against four LDK activists from Malisheve starts today in Prizren. Ali and Rrahm Pacarizi, Osman Krasniqi, and Mustafa Morina were arrested on 24 May this year.

Intensifying Repression

Dr. Rugova called for the suspension of this trial and the release of political prisoners, as well as the release of Ukshin Hoti, chairman of the National Unity Party, and of the officials of the Kosova Chamber of Commerce.

The president of the Republic of Kosova mentioned the latest campaign of repression in the commune of Podujeve in connection with an incident, possibly staged by the Serbian police, in which shots were allegedly fired at the police car. Dr. Rugova said that old insults about the Albanians being terrorists are being revived in connection with this incident. This label is also being revived in connection with the announced return to Kosova of Albanian refugees in Switzerland.

These Albanian refugees are being called terrorists, as at the beginning of the year, when Germany announced the possible repatriation of refugees from Kosova.

Dr. Rugova called this new campaign an intensification of the repression, and called on the international community to maintain a presence in Kosova and to take Kosova under its protection.

Dr. Rugova went on to welcome the statement by the holy father, Pope John Paul II, about the reconciliation of the Balkan peoples and his declaration on the rights of the peoples to political recognition.

Dr. Rugova welcomed the annual report of the International Helsinki Federation on the discrimination and violence in Kosova, calling this federation the most active association monitoring the situation in Kosova in recent years.

He welcomed the demand of U.S. Congressman Tom Soyer for the deployment of observers in Kosova.

BORBA's journalist asked whether Dr. Rugova was satisfied with the election of the new LDK Presidium, and whether it was true that Dr. Fehmi Agani had resigned, also asking what his reasons were. Dr. Rugova said that the LDK General Council had met on Tuesday [13 September] and had elected a presidium. It is true that Dr. Fehmi Agani, one of my closest colleagues, has tendered his resignation. We will consider his resignation in the next few days. Edita Tahari has also submitted her resignation. These are internal matters of the party, which we will consider in the General Council, because the Presidium has still not been constituted, Rugova said.

The Voice of America correspondent asked the same question.

ATA's correspondent asked for Dr. Rugova's remarks on the international interest in the idea of a confederation between Kosova and Albania. Great interest has been shown in the idea of a confederation between Kosova and Albania, Rugova said. This is one option for an independent and neutral Kosova with the right to confederal ties with Albania. We have also discussed this idea with foreign diplomats visiting Kosova. There are reports that this demand has met with a response in the world's media.

Replying to a question about the sanctions against Serbia and Montenegro, Dr. Rugova said that the sanctions against Serbia cannot be lifted so easily. We have continually demanded that Kosova must be one of the conditions for the lifting of sanctions, he said.

The Radio Skopje correspondent asked whether the CSCE observers can be expected to return to Kosova soon. Rugova said that many institutions, including the United Nations, the CSCE, the Group of Seven, etc.,

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have demanded the return of observers to Kosova, but added that for the moment there is no early prospect of the return of the CSCE observers. However, he said that the international community can be present in Kosova in other ways.

Deutsche Welle's correspondent asked for a comment on the public's feeling that, as she put it, the LDK is splitting into two wings, one of the former political prisoners, as the left wing, and another, the moderate wing, led by Rugova. Rugova said that it will not go as far as a split in the LDK, even though both in Kosova and in the Albanian community a split is dangled in front of us like a bogey. I repeat yet again that the LDK is a civil party of the center and unites all people of goodwill. It is not an ideological party, like the Communist Party, which knocked the heads together of those who joined and cut off the heads of those it expelled. Even under these circumstances of occupation, we are trying to cultivate a democratic spirit, and this is why we have been accepted abroad as a democratic movement.

HINA's correspondent quoted part of Dr. Rugova's speech at the meeting of the LDK General Council, in which he expressed satisfaction with the composition of this council, and asked whether the new Presidium could guarantee unity and continuity. Rugova said that he was satisfied with the composition of the General Council. It includes active intellectuals. Misunderstanding has arisen among us concerning people who have become involved in politics and consider politics as their job. Some circles call them nonintellectuals. However, the Albanian world today fortunately has a good intellectual level. There are, therefore, active intellectuals in the General Council who have determined to become involved and to do something concrete, and not merely to talk. There are also other tried and tested activists who are members. I, therefore, consider the new Presidium too to be a Presidium of continuity and consolidation. It is however normal for people to criticize the composition of the Presidium, and members of the Presidium themselves have this right too.

The Voice of America correspondent asked whether Dr. Rugova would insist on Dr. Agani withdrawing his resignation. President Rugova said that the General Council will consider his resignation.

BUJKU's journalist asked for a comment from Dr. Rugova on what he called the labels that are being attached to the members of the new LDK Presidium, such as "leftist" and "Marxist-Leninist." Dr. Rugova reiterated yet again the stand that the LDK is not an ideological party. This is evident in the party's program and in its work so far. It is a party of all social strata and of people with different views, and the LDK has not denied anyone the right to join and contribute to the party. It is also normal that there should be fractions, but there exists a kind of wariness of fractions throughout the postcommunist world, because people were sent to prison because of the term fraction. He added that the motives of the people using these labels are not clear, and that other labels such as fascist, etc., might be used in the future.

In reply to a question from KOHA's journalist about possible help from Kosova to combat cholera in Albania, Dr. Rugova recalled the difficult situation in Kosova and expressed the hope that the Albanian community abroad, which has always aided Albania, will continue to do so in this situation. RFI's correspondent asked for Dr. Rugova's view of the "exclusion, virtual exclusion of the Albanians' political life from the newspaper BUJKU," because the directors of BUJKU are also high-level LDK officials. Rugova said that he did not wish to comment at length on newspapers. Some BUJKU journalists have been elected to the LDK General Council and no one can deny them this right. They were nominated and elected. I have not sought to influence newspapers, and do not wish to do so. Today as in the past, BUJKU supplies information about what is happening in political life in Kosova, and on what is happening in the LDK. Other newspapers and magazines also do this, Dr. Rugova said, concluding the news conference.

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